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International Antitrust
I. Developments in Argentina*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A bill was submitted to the Argentine Congress on March 29, 2007, proposing amend-
ments to the statute organizing the Tribunal Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia
(TNDC) and to Argentina's merger control procedure.' In terms of organizational mat-
ters, the bill provides that the TNDC will be situated in Buenos Aires, although it will be
able to hold meetings anywhere in the Argentine Republic. 2 The TNDC's seven mem-
bers will be appointed by the Argentine Executive Branch for a term of six years, following
completion of a public selection process involving examination by a special jury.3
With respect to merger control, the bill provides that the TNDC will be required to
issue its decision on a proposed merger within forty days of receipt of a completed appli-
cation 4 (the current waiting period for CNDC review is forty-five days). If no decision is
issued within this forty-day period, the transaction will be deemed authorized. The forty-
day review period may be suspended if the TNDC requests additional documentation, but
only on one occasion.5
The bill also provides that the TNDC's merger decisions will be communicated to the
Secretary of Domestic Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Production. 6 In cases
where approval has been granted, the Secretary will have three days within which to rec-
ommend to the Ministry that the TNDC's decision be overruled and that proceedings be
commenced. Circumstances in which such a recommendation can be made are limited to
where the transaction involves specific sectors (public utilities, defense, energy, or mining)
or where the transaction would result in a "significant" impact on employment and invest-
ment in Argentina.
B. MERGERS
The CNDC rendered decisions approving a variety of transactions in 2007, including in
the telephone, food, media, cable, and electric power sectors. Of particular interest was a
* The contribution for Argentina was written by Alfredo Rovira and Maria Jos6 Rodriguez Macias of
Brons & Salas.
1. Proyecto de Ley No. S-611/07, Mar. 29, 2007 (Arg.), http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/proyectos/ver-
Expe.phporigen=S&tipo=PL&numexp=611/07&nrocomision=&tConsulta=3. The TNDC will replace the
current Argentinean antitrust authority, known as the Comisi6n Nacional de Defensa de la Compentencia
(CNDC).
2. Id. art. 4.
3. Id. art. 5-6.
4. Id. art. 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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transaction in the electric power sector that the CNDC declined to authorize. This trans-
action involved the proposed indirect acquisition by EP Primrose Spain S.L. (Primrose) of
Compafifa de Transporte de Energia Elctrica en Alta Tensi6n Transener S.A. (Tran-
sener).7 Rather than conducting its own review of the transaction, the CNDC denied its
approval on the basis that both the national electricity regulator and the Secretary of En-
ergy were of the opinion that Primrose was not an appropriate purchaser because it had no
experience in the electricity industry.8
C. CARTELS
The CNDC imposed a fine of $250,000 (equivalent to approximately US$79,000)9 on
Shell Gas S.A. and Totalgaz Argentina S.A. for engaging in a market sharing agreement
involving the sale of bottled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).' 0 The parties' conduct was
found to be contrary to Sections 1 and 2, subsection c of Argentina's Antitrust Law."
The market allocation agreement came to light after a customer of Shell Gas tried to
purchase bottled LPG from Totalgaz and was told that it could not do so because it was a
Shell Gas customer.
H. Developments in Australia*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
1. Trade Practices Amendment Bills
Late in 2006, the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) of 2006 was
passed, amending the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (TPA)12 The key amendments, dis-
cussed in last year's publication, came into force on January 1, 2007.
On September 24, 2007, the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) of
2007 came into force. 13 The key amendments to the TPA include: supplementing the
existing rule against the misuse of market power by specifically prohibiting predatory pric-
7. See EP Primose Spain S.L., C.N.D.C. Dictamen No. 591 (2006) (Arg.), available at http://www.mecon.
gov.ar/cndc/dictamenes.htm. Specifically, Primrose proposed to acquire the 50% interest in Transener held
by Petrobas Energia S.A. (Petrobas).
8. Camara Nacional de Apealaciones Especial Civil y Commerical de la Capital Federal [CNEspecial Civ.
Y Com.] (National Court in Federal Civil and Commercial Matters], 21/06/2007, "Petrobas Energia S.A. y
Otro c/ Sec. Comerico Interior/ anticompetitive," La Ley [L.L.] (2007) (Arg.) (Denying Primrose's appeal of
the CNDC's decision).
9. Id.
10. See Shell Cas, C.N.D.C. Dictamen No. 529 (2006), available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cndc/
dictamenes/dictamen-mayol-shell-resumen.pdf.
11. See Law No. 25,156, Sept. 10, 1999, [LIX-D] A.D.L.A. 3942 ("To the extent the circumstances de-
scribed in Section 1 are present, the following action, among others, comprises a restriction on competition:
(c) [hlorizontally distribute zones, markets, customers and sources of supplies").
* The contribution for Australia was written by Paul Schoff and Jackie Mortensen of Minter Ellison.
12. Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 2006 (Austi.), available at http://www.comlaw.
gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/Actl .nsf/0/35CFA305E5D5F195CA257220001 10A55?OpenDocument.
13. Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 2007 (Ausd.), available at http://www.comlaw.
gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act 1.nsf/asmade/bytitie/
32F8360D719DA01ACA257369001E815E?OpenDocutment.
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ing; 14 providing further assistance to the Courts in determining whether a corporation has
a substantial degree of power in a market; 15 extending the application of Section 51AC of
the TPA (unconscionable conduct in business transactions) from transactions of up to
AUD3 million (approx. US$2.75 million) to transactions of up to $10 million (approx.
US$9.17 million);16 and adding a second Deputy Chairperson position to the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).17
On June 21, 2007, the Corporations (NZ Closer Economic Relations) and Other Legis-
lation Amendment Act of 2007 came into force s18 The Act amends the TPA by setting
out the circumstances in which the ACCC is authorized to provide information or docu-
ments that it has received in confidence or acquired by virtue of its statutory powers to
foreign government bodies, including competition regulators.
2. Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act 2006
The provisions of the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act of
2006, removing the restrictions on media proprietors from owning a combination of free-
to-air television, radio, and newspapers came into force on April 4, 2007.19 Since these
restrictions were removed, there have been several media mergers in Australia, particularly
in relation to rural media services. 20
B. COURT DECISIONS
On May 29, 2007, the Federal Court handed down its decision in Leahy.21 The ACCC
alleged the existence of a fuel price fixing cartel, tendering direct evidence and admissions
from individual retailers as well as circumstantial evidence in the form of records of tele-
phone calls made between the retailers and records of changes to the retail price of petrol.
The Court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove
the existence of a commitment, moral obligation, or obligation binding in honor to adhere
to the agreement.
Following an appeal by the ACCC, the High Court handed down its decision in Baxter
Healthcare on August 29, 2007.22 Overturning long-standing authority, the Court held
that corporations dealing with the government are not protected from the operation of
the TPA on the basis of derivative crown immunity.
14. Id. sched. 2, pt. 1, 1(A) (amending subsection 46(1)).
15. Id. sched. 2, pts. 1, 2-11.
16. Id. sched. 3, §§ 7, 8.
17. Id. sched. 1.
18. Corporations (NZ Economic Relations) and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2006 (Austi.), available
at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Actl.nsf/asmade/bytide/A5E7C2A70456ECE2CA25730
70000058C?OpenDocument.
19. Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act, 2006 (Austl.), available at http://www.com-
law.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1 .nsfOf/D52 1B53B624EF88DCA2572200010B 19?OpenDocument.
20. See, e.g., Lyndal McFarland, Fairfax is Ripe for Takeover Under New Rules, WALL ST. J. (Eastern Edition),
Apr. 12, 2007, at B.2.
21. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd. (2007) FCA 794, available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/ cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/federalc/2007/794.html?query=Aleahy.
22. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd. (2007) HCA 38, available
at http://www.austli.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cthi/HCA/2007/38.html?querybaxter.
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IIM. Developments in Belgium*
A. MERGERS
2007 was the first complete year of merger reviews conducted under the new Belgian
Competition Act's23 significant impediment to effective competition standard. This stan-
dard replaced the former dominance test.
Nearly all notified mergers in 2007 were cleared without commitments pursuant to the
Competition Council's simplified merger notification procedure. This procedure requires
a much less detailed information form to be submitted and can be used where: (i) the
merging parties do not operate in the same markets; (ii) the combined market shares of
the merging parties in any overlap markets do not exceed 25 percent; (iii) the parties
acquire joint control over a joint venture with no or limited activities in Belgium; or (iv) a
party acquires sole control over a company in which it already has joint control.2 4 The
Body of Auditors must provide a response within twenty workings days. 25
Of more significant note was a decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal regarding a
transaction that was originally completed in 1997.26 This case involved the Kinepolis
group of movie theatres, which was formed in 1997 subject to certain commitments im-
posed by the Competition Council. In April 2007, the Council ruled that Kinepolis no
longer had to abide by its commitments due to changes in market circumstances, such as
the entry of new theatres and strong competition from other forms of entertainment (e.g.,
television, DVDs, the Internet, etc.). 27 Several competitors of Kinepolis appealed this
decision to the Brussels Court of Appeal, which granted an interim stay of the Council's
decision on the basis that the Council had not established a change in circumstances suffi-
cient to rescind Kinepolis' commitments.28 The case is now pending a hearing on the
merits.
* The contribution for Belgium was written by Bruno Lebnm and Thibault Balthazar of Latham &
Watkins LLP.
23. Loi sur la Protection de la concurrence 6conomique [Law on the Protection of Economic Competi-
tion],July 1, 1999, http://mineco.fgov.be/organizationmarket/competition/law_competitionfr001.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2008).
24. See Competition Council, Regles Specificuques D'Une Notification Simpifiee de Concentrations
[Rules on Simplified Notification of Concentrations] (Belg.), http//www.google.com/translate?u=http%
3A%2F%2Fmineco.fgov.be%2Forganization market%2Fcompetition%2Fhoejfr.htm.&langpair=fr%7Cen
&hl=en&ie=UTF8 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
25. Belgium's competition authorities consist of the Competition Council (an independent administrative
authority with decision-making powers) and the Competition Service (a department of the Ministry of Econ-
omy which is responsible for investigations). The Body of Auditors forms part of the Competition Council.
See Loi sur la Protection de la concurrence economique, supra note 22, art. 29.
26. See UGC et. al, Belgium Competition Council, Hof van Beroep te Brussel [Brussell Court of Appeals],
Aug. 23, 2007, http://cgsh.com/files/Publication/75b5fc~c-leec-49db-bd53339009cl4a3c/Presentation/Pub-
licationAttachment/235 1 7924-87f9-4a86-addf354957dba853/Apr%202007%20-%2ONational%2OCompeti-
tion%20Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
27. See Competition Council, Decision NO. 2007-CIC-12, April 16, 2007, http://economie.fgov.be/organ-
ization market/competition/jurisprudence/122007cc12_verzoekKinepolis-opheffing-pub.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2008).
28. See UGC et. al Belgian Competition Council, Hof van Berop te Brussell [Brussels Court of Appeal],
Aug. 23, 2007, http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/75b5fcc-leec-49db-bd53-339009c14a3c/Presenta-
tion/PublicationAttachment/23517924-87f9-4a86-addf-354957dba853/Apr%202007%20-%2ONationa%20
Competition%20Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
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B. CARTELS
The new Competition Act provides an express legal basis for Belgium's leniency pro-
gram.29 A revised program was issued on October 22, 2007, and now largely mirrors the
program recommended by the European Competition Network.30 Belgium's leniency
program applies only to cartels and provides that a full or partial exoneration of fines can
be granted when the party provides the Belgian competition authorities with evidence of
the prohibited practice and permits them to identify the cartel's participants.
IV. Developments In Brazil*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A bill to restructure the Brazilian System of Competition Defence (SBDC) is currently
before Brazil's National Congress. 31 Among other things, the bill would introduce im-
portant changes to Brazil's merger review system, such as the establishment of a
mandatory waiting period within which a transaction could not close without approval.
The waiting period would be a maximum of 130 days for complex cases. Currently, there
is no obligation under Brazilian law to obtain approval for a notifiable merger transaction
prior to closing. The bill is not expected to be voted on until the second half of 2008.
Efforts also continue to streamline the administration and enforcement of Brazilian
competition law. For example, SDE and CADE's legal office (ProCADE) signed a coop-
eration agreement in July 2007 to promote joint procedures and reduce overlapping re-
views. 32 Legislation was also enacted in May 2007 to permit CADE and SDE to accept
commitments or undertakings (known as TCCs) from companies under investigation for
cartel practices. The legislation also authorizes CADE to impose fines for failure to com-
ply with a TCC.33
29. Loi sur la Protection de la concurrence economique, supra note 23, art. 49, § 2.
30. See Competition Council, Communication du Conseil de la concurrence sur l'exon~ration totale ou
partielle des sanctions pcuniaires dans les affaires portant sur des ententes [Notice on immunity from fines
and reductions of fines in cartel cases, OFFICIAL BELGIUM GAZETTE, October 22, 2007, p. 11503,
available at http://mineco.fgov.be/organization-market/competition/press-releases/annex/Communication-
clemence.pdf.
* The contribution for Brazil was written by Mirio Nogueria, Ricardo Inglez de Souza, Bruno Drago,
and Stefanie Schmitt of Demarest e Almeida.
31. See ProposiqIo de Lei No. 3934/2004, http://www.camara.gov.br./siley/Prop-Detalhe.asp?id=260404.
The SBDC consists of three agencies: CADE, the Brazilian competition authority; SEAE, the office of the
Ministry of Finance responsible for economic investigations; and SDE, the office of the Ministry of Justice
responsible for investigating anti-competitive conduct.
32. SDE and CADE, Termo De Accordo De Cooperaca Tecnico-Operacional ProCade/SDE [Cooperation
Agreement Between SDE and ProCade], July 2007, http://www.mj.gov.br/sde/data/Pages/MJ3443 IBE81TE
MID4F5AE714C24F47178996742E1EC1BE94PTBRIE.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
33. See Lei No. 11.482 de 31 de Maio de 2007 (amending art. 53 of Lei No. 8.884/94), http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil/_Ato2007-2010/2007/Lei/LI 1482.htm#artl6 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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B. MERGERS
In 2007, CADE approved important international and national transactions, such as the
acquisition of Novelis Inc. by the Aditya Birla Group of India. 34 The latter transaction
was approved without conditions. In another major transaction involving the gas distribu-
tion industry, however, CADE required the parties to delay closing pending the comple-
tion of the merger review process. 35
In August 2007, the Federal Court decided that CADE is competent to review mergers
and acquisitions between banks. 36 Prior to this decision, it was believed that transactions
between banks were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Brazilian Central Bank.
Finally, the courts issued several decisions confirming that the obligation to file pre-
merger notifications is triggered by the execution of the first binding document between
the parties. This confirmation clarifies an important point for Brazil's merger review pro-
cess since pre-merger notifications must be filed within fifteen business days of the trig-
gering event.37
C. CARTELS
There are approximately 180 cartel cases currently being investigated by SDE. Some of
the most important ones involve air cargo, orange juice, and gas distribution.
There is also an emphasis being placed on prosecuting unlawful bid-rigging. For exam-
ple, SDE established a new department to investigate misconduct in public tenders. 38 In
September 2007, CADE fined participants in a bid-rigging scheme involving private se-
curity companies more than BRL50 million (approximately US$29.3 million).39 This case
is also notable because it is the first time that CADE prosecuted a case on the basis of
evidence that was disclosed through the application of its leniency program. 40
Finally, the Courts confirmed CADE's decisions in several leading cartel cases, such as
the crushed stone cartel case. 41 This is a very important case in SBDC's development
34. Novelis Inc, CADE [Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica] Processos Administrativos No.
08012.002813/2007-791 (2007), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/andamento-frame.asp?pro-
codigo=7806&tipprocodigo=4.
35. Ipiranga Group, CADE [Conselho Adminstrativo de Defesa Economica] Processos Administrativos
No. 08012.002813/2007-91 (2007) (involving the acquisition of the Ipiranga Group, owners of a leading
Brazilian gas distributor, by several competitors (Petrobris, Braskem and Ultra)).
36. See T.R.F. Ap. No. 2002.34.00.033475-0, Reporting: Des. Selene Maria de Almeida, 30.08.2007
(Brazil).
37. For example, the Federal Court decision in reference to the fine imposed by CADE, regarding the
submission of the transaction between Sino dos Alpes Alimentos Ltda. and Sesto Holdings N.V. (Concentra-
tion Act no 08012.000679/2003-61).
38. See Secretaria de Acompanhamento Economico [SDE], Ruling No. 1.077, General Coordination for
Analysis of Violations in the Public Biddings Sector (May 30, 2007).
39. See CADE [Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economical Processos Administrativos No.
08012.001826/2003-10 (2003), available at http://www.mj.gov.br/data/Pages/MJ34431BE81TEMIDFAA
7E815317F40FBA7BBFB53523D5716PTBRIE.htm.
40. Id.
41. See Mendes Junior Engenhaira S/A, CADE [Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economical Processos
Administrativos No. 08012.002127/2002-14 (2002), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/anda-
mento.frame.asp?pro-codigo=2434&tippro-codigo=22.
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because it marks the first time that SDE used sophisticated investigative procedures, such
as search and seizures.
V. Developments In Canada*
A. COMPETITION POLICY UNDER REVIEW
In July 2007, the Canadian government announced the establishment of a Competition
Policy Review Panel (the "Panel") to examine the impact of Canada's competition and
foreign investment laws on the country's domestic and international competitiveness.42
The specific issues the Panel intends to address in its report (due byJune 30, 2008) are set
out in a consultation paper that was released in October 2007.4 3 The key competition-
related questions in the Panel's consultation paper include: (i) how does Canada's compe-
tition policy affect Canadian competitiveness in an environment of globalization and free
trade; (ii) what international best practices would strengthen Canadian competitiveness as
a destination for foreign investment; and (iii) does Canada's approach to mergers strike
the right balance between consumers' interest in vigorous competition and the creation of
an environment from which Canadian firms can grow to become global competitors?
B. OTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On June 22, 2007, amendments to Canada's principal federal transportation legislation,
the Canada Transportation Act (CTA), came into force.44 Among other things, the
amendments establish a new "public interest" review process for mergers involving trans-
portation undertakings falling under federal jurisdiction.45 This new process supple-
ments-and to some degree supersedes-the generally applicable merger review process
conducted by the Competition Bureau (the "Bureau") under the Competition Act.46 In
brief, competition mergers that are considered to raise public interest issues will now be
reviewed by the federal transportation regulatory body (the Canada Transportation
Agency) as well as the Bureau, and the merger will require approval of the Federal Cabinet
in order to proceed.
C. MERGERS
In March 2007, the Competition Tribunal (the "Tribunal") denied an application by the
Bureau for an interim injunction to temporarily prohibit the acquisition by Labatt Brew-
* The contribution for Canada was written by Mark Katz and Elisa Kearney of Davies Ward Phillips &
Vineberg LLP.
42. See Press Release, Industry Canada, Canada's New Government Creates Competition Policy Review
Panel (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/261ce5OOdfcd7259852564820068
de6d/c44dbc3 5890c40ef852573ccOO6ca6eO!OpenDocument.
43. See Competition Policy Review Panel, Sharpening Canada's Competitive Edge (2007), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/ en/h_00009e. html.
44. Canada Transportation Act, 2007 S.C., ch. 19 (Can.), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/
Bills/391/Govemment/C- 11/C-i 1_4/C-i 1l4.pdf.
45. Generally speaking, Canada's federal Parliament has jurisdiction over transportation undertakings that
operate interprovincially as well as those entities that provide integrally related ancillary services.
46. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can).
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ing Company Ltd. of Lakeport Brewing, another Canadian brewery. 47 The Bureau ar-
gued that it required additional time (prescribed by statute) to complete its investigation
into whether the proposed merger would prevent or lessen competition substantially.
The Tribunal ruled that a temporary injunction was not appropriate given the circum-
stances. In particular, the Tribunal held that permitting the transaction to proceed would
not "substantially impair" its ability to remedy any negative effects on competition should
the Bureau successfully challenge the merger at a later date.48 The Bureau has appealed
the Tribunal's decision even though the transaction was completed in August 2007. 49
D. CARTELS
On October 10, 2007, the Bureau released a revised version of its Information Bulletin
on the granting of immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses under the Competi-
tion Act.50 The purpose of the revisions is to clarify certain aspects of the Bureau's immu-
nity program and to achieve, where possible, consistency with the programs of other
enforcement agencies. The Bureau's immunity program, like amnesty/leniency programs
in other jurisdictions, has been an effective tool in uncovering and prosecuting criminal
anti-competitive conduct in Canada, particularly cartel activity.
E. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
The last several years have witnessed ongoing litigation involving an application
brought by the Bureau under the Competition Act's abuse of dominance provisions to
challenge a "loyalty program" offered by Canada Pipe Ltd. (Canada Pipe) to its customers.
Canada Pipe, which manufactures cast iron drain, waste, and vent (DWV) products, suc-
ceeded at first instance before the Tribunal. 51 The Tribunal's decision was subsequently
reversed by Canada's Federal Court of Appeal and remanded to the Tribunal for re-deter-
mination.5 2 On May 10, 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada denied Canada Pipe's appli-
cation for leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal's decision.5 3 As a result, the matter
will be re-heard by the Tribunal starting in February 2008.
47. Comm'r of Competition v. Labatt Brewing Co. Ltd., et al., (Mar. 28, 2007] Competition. Tribunal
Dec. No. 2007-003, available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/english/CaseDetails.asp?x=67&CaseID=282#387.
48. The Bureau has the authority to challenge a merger within three years of closing. See Competition Act,
supra note 45, § 2.
49. See Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Appeals Decision in Labatt-Lakeport Merger (April 11,
2007), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/ epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/02297e.html.
50. Competition Bureau, Information Bulletin, Immunity Program Under the Competition Act (Oct.
2007), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/ epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/02297e.html.
51. Comm'r of Competition v. Canada Pipe Company Ltd., [20051 40 C.P.R. 453; Competition.Tribunal
Dec. No. 2002-006, available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2002-006_0079b-38KCZ-9272006-
4715.pdfwindowSize=popup.
52. Comnm'r of Competition v. Canada Pipe Company Ltd., [20061 F.C. 233, available at http://reports.fja.
gc.ca/en/2006/2006fca233/2006fca233.html
53. See Press Release, Competition Bureau, Supreme Court Confirms Approacb to Abuse of Dominance Cases
(May 10, 2007), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/ epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/02328e.html.
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IV. Developments in Chile*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Congress is still considering a bill submitted by the Executive on June 20, 2006, the
main objective of which is to strengthen the enforcement of the Antitrust Statute and
increase the independence and impartiality of the Antitrust Court and its members.54
On February 16, 2007, the Unfair Competition Law was published in the Official Ga-
zette.55 This is the first time that a statute specifically regulates unfair competition in
Chile. The Unfair Competition Law provides that any conduct that seeks to mislead
customers constitutes an act of unfair competition. Examples of conduct that would be
considered unfair competition include comparative advertising and sham litigation.
B. MERGERS
The Antitrust Court approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by GLR Chile
Ltda. of Iberoamerican Radio Chile S.A., as well as interests in other corporations con-
trolling domestic radio stations. 56 The conditions included the requirement that GLR
Chile Ltda. consult the Antitrust Court prior to any further acquisitions of radio stations.
The Antitrust Court also reduced the duration of the non-competition covenant that pre-
vents Iberoamerican Group from entering the broadcast business in Chile to a term of two
years. This is the first time the Antitrust Court has ruled on the duration of non-competi-
tion covenants.
C. CARTELS
The Antitrust Court recently dismissed a claim filed by the Antitrust Attorney General
against private health insurance companies, alleging that they had conspired to reduce the
coverage of certain health plans.5 7 In a split decision, the Antitrust Court found that there
was not enough evidence of collusion and, therefore, insufficient grounds for conviction.
An appeal before the Supreme Court is pending.
D. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
In a complaint filed by the Antitrust Attorney General against Lan Airlines S.A. and
Lan Cargo S.A., the Antitrust Court found that the defendants had abused their dominant
position in the customs warehousing and cargo storage market in the city of Punta Arenas
* The contribution for Chile was written by Claudio Lizana, Marcos Rios and Maria Jos6 Henrfquez of
Carey y Cia.
54. Bill No. 4630/2006 (Chile), available at http://www.bcn.cl (proposing to amend Law Decree No. 211
(1973), as modified by Law No. 19, 911 (2003)).
55. Law No. 20.169, Feb. 16, 2007 (Chile), available at http://catalogo.bcn.cl/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=
QSP3990684234.32429&menu=search&aspect=subtab 147&npp=10&ipp= 10&spp=20&profile=bcn&ri=
5 &source=% 7E% 21 horizon&index=.GW&term=20169&aspect=subtab 147#focus.
56. See beroamerican Radio Chile S.A., Tribunal De Defensa De La Libre Competencia, Judgment No.
20/2007, available at www.tdlc.cl.
57. See Isapre ING S.A., Tribunal De Defensa De La Libre CompetenciaJudgment No. 57/2007, available
at www.tdlc.cl.
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by charging additional fees for freighting to external storage rooms.58 The Antitrust
Court imposed a fine of 165 UTA (approximately US$125,000) against both defendants.
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.59
VII. Developments in China*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
After thirteen years of intense debate, 60 on August 30, 2007, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress passed China's new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).61 The
provisions of this new legislation are considered in detail in the report of the China Com-
mittee elsewhere in this issue.
B. MERGERS
Until the AML is implemented, merger review in China will continue to be governed
by Sections 51-54 of the September 2006 Regulations for Mergers and Acquisitions of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the "Foreign M&A Regulations").6 2 As is
evident from its title, this law applies only to acquisitions by foreign investors; purely
domestic transactions are not currently subject to merger review in China.
The Foreign M&A Regulations are enforced by the Antimonopoly Office of the Minis-
try of Commerce (MOFCOM) and State Administration of Industry (SAIC). The An-
timonopoly Law Office has increasingly resorted to second phase reviews of proposed
transactions believed to raise significant competitive concerns. Among the cases that un-
derwent second-phase hearings in 2007 were SEB's proposed acquisition of Supor 63 and
Carlyle's proposed acquisition of Xuzhong Machinery.
Government enforcement of existing competition-related laws became more active in
2007, partly due to pressures from rapidly increasing prices. For example, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) investigated and issued penalties in a
series of price-fixing cases, notably in the food sector, including a widely reported case
involving the Chinese Instant Noodle Association.64 Private parties in China are also be-
58. See Lan Airlines S.A., Tribunal De Defensa La Libre Competenica, Judgment No. 55/2007, available at
www.tdlc.cl.
59. See Lan Airlines S.A., Supreme Court, Judgment No. 55/2007, available at www.tdlc.cl.
* The contribution for China was written by Peter Wang and Yizhe Zhang of Jones Day.
60. THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLI-
CATIONS, Foreword (Shang Ming ed., 2007).
61. Fan long duan fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's
Congr. on Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), available at htrp://www.law-lib.com/law/law-viewl.asp?id=
212679 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
62. Guan yu wai go tou zi zhe bing gou jing nei qi ye de gui ding, MOFCOM, State-Owned Asset
Supervision and Administration Commission, State Administration of Taxation, SAIC, China Securities Reg-
ulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006), arts.
51-54, available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/b/c/200608/20060802839585.
63. China View, SEB Given Green Ligbt to Acquire Majority Interest in Cbina's Supor, available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/12/content_5967426.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
64. Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-08/28/content_6617725.hts. Food Group Slam-
med for Price Collusion, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/business/
221206.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
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ginning to use competition laws as a weapon against competitors. For example, Dongjin
sued Intel for monopolization contrary to the Contract Law (the case was settled in
May),65 and Tsum's sued Sony for manufacturing digital cameras and recorders that are
incompatible with non-Sony batteries in violation of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law
(this case remains pending).66
VIII. Developments In Colombia*
A. MERGERS
On March 31, 2007, Colombia's competition authority, the Superintendent of Industry
and Commerce (SIC), gave its conditional approval to Postobon's purchase of 100 percent
of the corporate capital of Projugos, a company controlled by Bavaria S.A.67 Both Pos-
tobon and Bavaria are leading producers of sodas, waters, and fruit beverages in Colombia.
Because of its concerns about the parties' combined market share in the fruit beverage
market, the SIC made its approval conditional on the sale or licensing of Projugos' most
important fruit beverage brand to an independent third party, together with other associ-
ated assets. The parties were also required to provide technical assistance to the purchaser
or licensee and to comply with other behavioral remedies, such as a prohibition on exclu-
sive agreements with customers.
On July 16, 2007, the SIC released its decision denying approval to the merger of Mex-
ichen (a dominant producer of the resin used to fabricate PVC tubes) and PAVCO (one of
the largest Colombian PVC manufacturers). 6s The SIC concluded that the merger would
have inhibited competition and increased barriers to entry by giving the merged entity the
ability to restrict access to PVC resin. The parties filed an appeal with the SIC, which
then reconsidered its original decision and approved the proposed merger, subject to the
following conditions: (i) the sale by PAVCO of a PVC industrial unit to an independent
third party; and (ii) that Mexichen would (a) assure the supply of PVC resins to PAVCO's
competitors at a fair price, and (b) not disclose to PAVCO information regarding its PVC
resin sales to PAVCO's competitors. 69
On June 14, 2007, the SIC initiated an investigation against Telmex S.A., Superview
S.A., TV Cable S.A., and TV Cable del Pacifico S.A. for not filing a mandatory pre-
merger notification in respect of their proposed transaction. 70 If the SIC determines that
65. Intel, China's Dongjin Close IPR Dispute, CMnNA DAILY, May 15, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2007-05/15/content_872737.htm. For history of the case, see http://tech.sina.com.cn/focus/intel
DJQ/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
66. Sony in Court for Battery Design, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Jan. 18, 2007, http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/200701/18/eng20070118_342432.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
* The contribution for Colombia was written by Mary Elena Lares Colmenares of Munoz Tamayo &
Asociados.
67. See Resolution SIC No. 09192 (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co.
68. See Resolution SIC No. 21345 (July 16, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co.
69. See Resolution SIC No. 29154 (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co.
70. See Resolution SIC Nos. 17651 and 17652 (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co. Colom-
bia's antitrust legislation requires that a pre-merger notification be filed for acquisitions involving companies
with: (i) a combined annual income in Columbia of greater than approximately US$22 million and (ii) assets
in Colombia with an estimated value of greater than US$22 million.
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the parties failed to give notice of the transaction prior to its implementation, it could
declare the merger void and impose monetary fines.
B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
On April 16, 2007, following a complaint filed by Heineken International of Colombia,
the SIC initiated an antitrust investigation against Bavaria S.A. for alleged anti-competi-
tive acts with respect to the marketing of its imported "Peroni" brand of beer.71 Heineken
alleged that Bavaria had abused its dominant position in the beer market by prohibiting its
customers from also selling Heineken products. Bavaria attempted to persuade the SIC to
terminate its investigation by offering certain remedies. The SIC, however, rejected Ba-
varia's proposal, finding the suggested remedies were not sufficient to guarantee that the
alleged anti-competitive practices would not continue in the future. 72
On March 9, 2007, the SIC initiated an investigation against thirteen sugar producers
for allegedly entering into an agreement to fix the prices they would pay for their supplies
of sugar cane. 73 The SIC's preliminary investigation produced evidence that the produc-
ers had adopted a uniform formula to determine the prices that they would pay. The
SIC's decision is still pending at the time of writing.
On November 30, 2007, the State Council, Colombia's supreme administrative court,
confirmed the SIC's decision that certain gas station operators had fixed the prices
charged for premium gasoline.74 This case is of particular interest because the SIC in-
ferred the existence of a price-fixing agreement between the parties based on their con-
duct, even in the absence of any evidence of a formal understanding to charge the same
prices.
IX. Developments in the European Union*
A. MERGERS
In June 2007, the European Commission blocked Ryanair's proposed takeover of Aer
Lingus, rejecting slot-related and other commitments offered by Ryanair. 75 This is the
first merger blocked by the Commission since 2004. Ryanair has appealed the decision. 76
In July 2007, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled partly in favor of
Schneider Electric in a damage claim for losses sustained as a result of the Commission's
conduct leading up to its decision prohibiting Schneider's acquisition of Legrand, a deci-
71. See Resolution SIC No. 23979 (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co.
72. See Resolution SIC No. 11304 (Aug. 5, 2007), available at http://www.sic.gov.co.
73. The measure was taken by the SIC through Resolution No. 6381 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://
www.sic.gov.co
74. See Rama Judicial de Colombia, Consejo de Estado, First Section, case: Rafael Ortiz Mantilla (Estaci6n
de Servicio La Pedregosa). Consejero Ponente: Rafael Ostau de La Font Planeta.
* The contribution for the European Union was written by Gunnar Wolf and Michael Clancy of
Covington & Burling.
75. Comp/M.4439, Ryanair/Aer Lingus fJune 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europa/eu/comm/competi-
tion/mergers/cases/decisions/M4439_2007062720610_en.pdf.
76. Case T-342/07, Ryanair Holdings Plc v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R; Case T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group v.
Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R (another proceeding before the CFI when the Commission did not force Ryanair to
dispose of its Aer Lingus shares).
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sion that was later annulled by the CFI in 2002. 77 In the first successful action of this
kind, the CFI held that Schneider's damages should include not only the expenses related
to the re-examination of the transaction, but also a portion of the resulting reduction in
the divestiture price.
B. CARTELS
The success of the Commission's leniency program, combined with increasing fines, has
resulted in another record year for the Commission's cartel unit. As of November 28,
2007, the total fines imposed in 2007 reached EUR3.33 billion (an 80 percent increase
over 2006, approximately US$5.12 billion), including the largest ever cartel fine imposed
(over EUR992 million or approximately US$1.52 billion) and the largest ever fine im-
posed against a single cartel participant (over EUR479 million or approximately US$736
million).7s The costs of cartel offenses in Europe are likely to increase further due to
tougher Commission fining guidelines, applicable to all antitrust fines decisions for which
a Statement of Objections is issued after September 1, 2006,79 and the Commission's push
for increased private enforcement in the E.U.8° The Commission is also seeking to free
resources to pursue more cartels by implementing a proposed "settlement" system,
whereby parties would receive a percentage reduction in their fines in exchange for their
admission of liability and waiver of certain procedural rights.8'
C. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
In September 2007, the CFI upheld all substantive elements of the Commission's 2004
decision requiring Microsoft to offer an unbundled version of its Windows operating sys-
tem without Windows Media Player and to license interoperability information to its
competitors for the development of competing interoperable work group server operating
systems
2
77. Case T-351/03, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm'n., 2007 E.C.R., http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/com-
muniques/cp07/aff/cpO70048en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
78. See Press Release, Europa, Competition: Commission Fines Members of Lifts and Escalators Cartels
over C990 million (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=IP/
07/209.
79. See Press Release, Europa, Competition: Revised Commission Guidelines for Setting Fines in Antitrust
Cases - Frequently Asked Questions (June 28, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/06/256.
80. See Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Remarks at Commission/IBA joint
Conference on EC Competition Policy: Reinforcing the Fight Against Cartels and Developing Private Anti-
trust Damage Actions: Two Tools for a more Competitive Europe, Commission/IBA Joint Conference on EC
Competition Policy, Brussels, (Mar.8, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=
SPEECH/07/128&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
81. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Calls for Comments and Draft Legislation Package
to Introduce Settlement Procedure for Cartels, Brussels (Oct. 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europe.eu/
comm/competition/cartelslegislation/ settlements.html.
82. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp v. Comm'n., 2007 E.C.R., http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communi-
ques/cp07/aff/cpO70063en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (Microsoft decided not to appeal the CFI's judg-
ment and to discontinue all other legal actions concerning the implementation of the Commission's 2004
decision and was subsequently found to be in compliance by the Commission); see also http://www.microsoft.
con/Prespass/legalnewsroomarchive.mspx?case=Europe% 2OCommission.
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The Commission scored another victory before the Community Courts in early 2007
when the Court of Justice upheld the Commission's decision fining British Airways for
granting travel agents retroactive rebates for year-on-year-sales targets.8 3
D. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In April 2007, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections against Apple and
major record companies alleging that the distribution system, whereby consumers can
only buy content from Apple's iTunes website in their country of residence, constitutes an
illegal segmentation of the Community market.84
The Commission was also very active in the energy sector. Among other things, the
Commission published the results of an inquiry into this sector;85 accepted commitments
by the dominant Belgian gas supplier, Distrigas, addressing foreclosure concerns; 86
opened similar proceedings against the French and Belgian electricity suppliers EDF and
Electrabel;87 opened proceedings against Germany's E.ON and France's EDF for alleged
market sharing and non-compete agreements;88 opened proceedings against Italy's ENI
and Germany's RWE, alleging that these companies use the control of their networks to
disadvantage new entrants and other competitors;8 9 and adopted a package of legislative
proposals for the electricity and gas markets, inter alia aiming at unbundling production
and supply from transmission (either by way of full unbundling or at least by way of creat-
ing an independent system operator).90
E. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2007, the CFI issued its judgment in Akzo Nobel, upholding previous case
law that communications with in-house counsel are not protected by legal professional
privilege in the context of EU competition law investigations. 91
83. Case C-95/04, British Airways v. Comm'n., 2007 E.C.R., http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communi-
ques/cpO7/aff/cpO70023en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
84. See Press Release, Europa, Competition: European Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of Ob-
jections Against Alleged Territorial Restrictions in On-Line Music Sales to Major Record Companies and
Apple, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/126.
85. Europa, Competition, Sector Inquiry-Energy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comrn/competition/
sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html.
86. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Increases Competition in the Belgian Gas Market -
Frequently Asked Questions (Oct. 11, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?refer-
ence=MEMO/07/407.
87. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Initiates Formal Proceedings Against Electrabel and
EDF for Suspected Foreclosure of Belgian and French Electricity Markets (July 27, 2007), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/313.
88. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Proceedings Against E.On and Gaz
de France Concerning Suspected Market Sharing (July 30, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleaseAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/316.
89. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Initiates Proceedings Against RWE Group Concern-
ing Suspected Foreclosure of German Gas Supply Markets (May 11, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/186.
90. See Press Release, Europa, Energising Europe: A Real Market with Secure Supply (Sept. 19, 2007),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=IP/07/1 361.
91. Cases T-125/03 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd & Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. Comm'n., 2007
E.C.R., http://curia.europa.eu/en/act-communiques/cp07/aff/cp70062en.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
VOL. 42, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 235
X. Developments in Finland*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A working group established by the Minister of Trade and Commerce is considering
whether there is a need to reform the Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions. 92 The
working group is required to complete its study and issue any proposals for amendments
to the legislation in the form of a Government Bill by the end of 2008. 93
B. MERGERS
All of the merger notifications received by the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) in
2007 were cleared. Only one transaction was referred to an in-depth or Phase II investi-
gation. It was eventually authorized after the merging parties decided to limit the scope of
the proposed transaction to avoid competitive overlaps. 94
C. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
In 2007, the FCA proposed that the Market Court impose fines on four regional tele-
communications network operators for abuse of a dominant position. 95 In each case, the
alleged abuse related to the dominant operator's pricing practices and rebate systems for
network connection services, which restricted competition in the downstream market by
preventing competitors from offering services through the dominant operator's network.
These cases are now pending before the Market Court, and the proposed fines range from
EUR40,000 to EUR100,000 (approximately US$61,400 to US$153,000).
D. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In February 2007, the FCA decided not to bring proceedings against Finland's three
largest roofing felt manufacturers, even though its investigation disclosed that they had
engaged in anticompetitive information exchanges. 96 The FCA concluded that the in-
fringement had occurred between 1996 and 2001, and that it was not clear whether the
provisions of the Act applied at that time to prohibit exchanges of sales information be-
tween competitors.
* The contribution for Finland was written by Satu Rantala of White & Case LLP.
92. Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992, as amended).
93. See Finnish Competition Authority, Working Group to Investigate the Need to Reform the Competition Act
(June 19, 2007), available at http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/english.cgi?luku=news-archive&sivu=news/
n-2007-06-19; see also Press Release, Ministry of Trade and Commerce (June 19, 2007), http://www.ktm.fi/
index.phtml?i=2222&s=1878 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
94. Hankkija-Maatalous Oy/L~nnen Tehtaat Oyj, No. 854/81/2006, available at http://www.kilpailuvirasto.
ft/cgibin/suomi.cgi?luku=vrityskauppavalvonta/yritskauppara+kaisut&sivu=ratk/r-2006- 81-0854_-2.
95. See FCA's Proposition to the Market Court in Oulun Putelin Oyj, No. 950/61/02 (May 24, 2007),
available at http://kilpailuvirasto.fitirdostot/ratldr-2002-61-0950.pdf; see also Finish Competition Authority,
FCA Proposes Fines to Three Telecommunications Companies (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.
kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/english.cgi?luku=news-archive&sivu=news/n-2007-10-24.
96. Icopaol Oy, Katepal Oy, Lemminltiinen Oyj, Rakennustuoteteollisuus RTT No. 1011/61/2002 (Feb.
16, 2007), available at http://www.kilapiluvirasto.fi/tiedostot/ratk/r-2002-61-101 l.pdf.
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E. OTHER
On September 13, 2007, the Nordic competition authorities published a joint report on
the operation of the Nordic electricity markets.97 According to the report, concentration
among electricity producers has increased in the Nordic region in recent years. The re-
port recognizes that it is important to ensure that the strong position of electricity pro-
ducers in individual countries does not adversely affect the functioning of the region's
electricity market.
XI. Developments in France*
A. MERGERS
On August 21, 2007, the French Ministry of Economy (Ministry), which is responsible
for merger control procedures, sanctioned a company for the first time for not respecting
the commitments it gave in order to obtain authorization for a merger.98 The Ministry
had authorized the acquisition of Sonnenglut, owner of the TREFF chain of stores, by
Carrefour, owner of the ED chain of stores, on the condition that Carrefour: (i) divest
itself of either a TREFF or ED store located in the Belfort region of France; (ii) guarantee
the sustainability of the business sold; and (iii) obtain the Ministry's approval of the buyer
before selling the business. Carrefour proceeded to sell the TREFF store to a third party
but failed to request the Ministry's approval and the store in question shut down subse-
quent to its sale. The Ministry decided that Carrefour had breached its commitment by:
(i) selling the TREFF store, which was of questionable economic viability, instead of the
ED store; (ii) not verifying whether the buyer was experienced and had sufficient financial
resources to ensure the sustainability of the business; and (iii) failing to obtain the Minis-
try's approval of the buyer.99 Carrefour has been ordered to sell the ED business in Bel-
fort to a buyer approved by the Ministry and to pay EUR100,000 in fines (approximately
US$153,000).100
B. CARTELS
On April 17, 2007, the French Competition Council published a revised procedural
notice modifying its leniency program, thus becoming the first Member State of the E.U.
to conform to the standards set out in the model leniency program proposed by the Euro-
97. See Finish Competition Authority, A Level Playing Field Precondition for Sound Electricity Markets (Sept.
13, 2007), available at http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/engish.cgi?luku=news-archive&sivu=news/n-
2007-09-13. The entire Nordic report is available at http://www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/tiedostot/Capacity-for-
competition.pdf.
* The contribution for France was written by Cyrille Couadou, J~r6me Fabre and Caroline Genevois of
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
98. See Bulletin Officiel de la Concurrence, de la Consounation et de la Rbpression des Fraudes, Arritidu
ministre de l'iconomie, des finances, et de lindustrie du 21 aofit 2007, relatif i l'inexicuiton par le grotipe Carrefour de
ses engagements deposes an titre du contrdle des concentrations, No. 7 (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http:/lwww.
minefi.gouv.fr/directionsservices/dgccrf/hoccrf/2007/07_O7bis/c2003_1 73_arreteinjonctioncarrefourtreff.
pdf.
99. Id. at 6-7.
100. Id. at 7.
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pean Competition Network in September 2006.101 Most notably, the notice: (i) in-
troduces a "marker" system to allow applicants to contact the Competition Counsel and
obtain a priority ranking even before providing full evidence of the violation;02 and (ii)
clarifies the requirements for obtaining full immunity or a reduction in fines, including
the information that must be provided at the different stages of the procedure. 03
On June 29, 2007, the French Supreme Court ruled on an appeal by French mobile
telephone operators Bouygues T6lcom, Orange France, and SFR against a decision is-
sued by the Paris Court of Appeal on December 12, 2006.104 The Paris Court of Appeal
had upheld the Competition Council's decision in 2005 to fine the operators a total of
EUR534 million (approximately US$819.5 million) for engaging in concerted practices
that had the effect of distorting competition in the French mobile telephone services
market.
The Supreme Court upheld the Paris Court of Appeal's finding that the three operators
had coordinated their behavior in order to stabilize market shares. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the lower court's ruling concerning exchanges of information that took
place between 1997 and 2003. The Supreme Court held that the Paris Court of Appeal
erred in holding that the fact these exchanges had occurred was alone sufficient to con-
clude that there had been a prohibited distortion of competition in the market.10s Instead,
the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal should have sought to establish, on the
evidence, that the information exchanges had distorted competition by reducing the oper-
ators' uncertainty about each other's competitive behavior.106 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion establishes that exchanges of information among competitors are not per se illegal in
France but that evidence will be required to demonstrate an anti-competitive effect.
XII. Developments in Germany*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The German Ministry for Economics has produced a draft amendment to Germany's
Act Against Restraints on Competition (ARC).107 Among other things, the draft amend-
ment proposes to make decisions of the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) relating to abuses of
101. Conseil de la Concurrence, R~publique Francaise, Procedural Notice Relating to the French Leniency Pro-
gram (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/doc/leniencyl 7april2007.pdf.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 3-4.





* The contribution for Germany was written by Susanne Zuehlke of Latham & Watkins LLP.
107. Siebtes Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, [Federal Law Gazette],
BGBI.I 2005, Part. I, 1954 -1969, last amended by Gesetz zur Beschleunigung der Umserzung von Offen-
tich-Privaten Parmerschaften und zur Verbesserung gesetzlicher Rahmenbedingungen ffir Offentlich-Pri-
vate Partnerschaften, BGBI. 2005, Part I, 2676-268 1. A non-official English version of the GWB is available
at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/CompetitionAct/CompAct.shtml.
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dominance effective immediately, i.e., appeals would not have a suspensory effect.108 This
would align practice in Germany with practice in the European Union. The draft also
contains specific proposed amendments relating to competition in the energy and grocery
sectors.
Also under consideration is a potential revision to the German merger threshold that
would reduce the large number of notifications that are triggered by transactions that have
no or very limited effects in Germany because the buyer alone exceeds the relevant
threshold. 109 At the time of writing, no decision had yet been made in this regard.
B. MERGERS
At the time of writing, the FCO had issued more than twenty Phase II merger decisions
in 2007, five of which resulted in decisions to prohibit the transactions in question. 110
The most significant of the FCO's prohibition decisions related to the proposed Phonak/
GN ReSound transaction, in which the FCO prohibited a foreign-to-foreign transaction,
the clear focus of which was outside Germany.11 The FCO found that the transaction
would strengthen an existing oligopoly in the German hearing aids market. The FCO
also decided that principles of international law and comity did not oblige it to limit its
ruling to the German aspects of the transaction, particularly because the competitive is-
sues related to GN ReSound's non-German R&D and production capabilities." 12
Also of importance is the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in the
Sulzer/Kelnix merger. 113 The BGH's decision clarifies the scope of the de minimis mar-
ket exception under German merger control law, pursuant to which mergers are exempt
from review if they relate to markets that have been in existence for at least five years and
for which total demand does not exceed EUR15 million (approximately US$23 million).
The CFO's practice had been to calculate the EUR15 million threshold based on Euro-
pean demand; the BGH has now confirmed that the threshold should be determined ac-
cording to demand in Germany. The effect of the judgment will be to broaden the
applicability of the de minimis exception.
108. See Press Release, German Ministry for Economics, Glos zur Verabschiedung des Energiepakets durch
das Kabinett (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemit-
teilungen,did=200652.html.
109. Under the current rules, a merger filing will be required in Germany where the acquiring party has
more than EUR500 million in global turnover and more than EUR25 million in German turnover. In these
circumstances, it is not necessary that the target have any presence in Germany at all.
110. The five prohibited transactions were: RWE Energie/Saar Ferngas (March 12, 2007); Cargotec/CVS
Ferrari (August 24, 2007); LBK Mariahilf (June 6, 2007); Sulzer/Kelmix (February 14, 2007); and Phonak/
GN ReSound (April 11, 2007). The texts of these decisions (in German) are available at http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de.
111. Bundeskartellamt, 3rd Decision Division, B3 578/06, Phonak/GN ReSound (Apr. 11, 2007) (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/entscheidungen/07_Phonake.pdf.
112. Other foreign-to-foreign transactions that have been prohibited are Sulzer/Kelmix and Coherent/Excel
(under appeal). Press releases (in English) and the texts of these decisions (in German) are available at http://
www.bundeskartellamt.de.
113. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH-KUR] [German Federal Supreme Court], 9/07, Sulzer/Kelmix (Sept. 25,
2007) (F.R.G.) (not yet published).
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C. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The most important private case currently pending before the German courts is a col-
lective damages action brought by Cartel Damages Claims SA (CDC) against the mem-
bers of a German cement cartel that was fined by the FCO in 2003. This is the first
collective action for damages brought against a cartel in Germany. On February 21, 2007,
the Regional Court in Diusseldorf issued an interim judgment holding that CDC had
standing to bring the claim and that the action could proceed. 114 This judgment is now
under appeal to the Higher Regional Court in Diiesseldorf. It is expected that the Re-
gional Court will commence oral hearings on the merits in December 2007.
XI. Developments in Hong Kong*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
At present, only two business sectors are regulated by competition laws in Hong
Kong-the telecommunications and broadcasting industries. Following a consultation
process initiated in late 2006, however, the Government announced on March 19, 2007,
that it would start the drafting process for a new competition law of general application." 5
The Government subsequently appointed legal advisers to consult further with stakehold-
ers and to prepare draft competition legislation. 1 6 At the time of writing, the draft had
not yet been released for comment. Current indications are that the Government pro-
poses to enact the new competition legislation by July 2008.
B. MERGERS
The Telecommunications Authority (TA) issued two merger decisions in 2007.117 The
first decision involved a transaction in which Connect Holdings, the parent company of
Asia Netcom Hong Kong Limited (Asia Netcom), proposed to acquire 2,250,000 ordinary
114. Landgericht Duesseldorf, Trial Court, 147/05, Case 34 0 (Kart) (Feb. 21, 2007) (F.R.G); see also Lan-
dgericht Duesseldorf, Schadensersatzprozess Um Zemenrkartellwirdfortgesetzt, (Feb. 21, 2007), available at
htp://www.lg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/press/dokument/02-07.pdf. CDC had purchased the claims from custom-
ers of the cement cartel.
* The contribution for Hong Kong was written by Simon Powell and Brian Pong of Jones Day.
115. Press Release, Gov't of Hong Kong Info. Servs., Cross-Sector Competition Law Backed (Mar. 19,
2007), available at http://www3.news.gov.hk/ISD/ebulletin/en/category/businessandfinance/070315/htmV
e0cldffe-8751-407a-874a-823db24e0a4e.htm.
116. See Press Release, Gov't of Hong Kong Info. Servs, Competition Law Consultants Appointed (June 5,
2007), available at http://www3.news.gov.hk/ISD/ebulletin/en/category/businessandfinance/070605/htm/
070605en03005.htm. See also Gov'T OF HONG KONG, CONSULTATION PAPER, PROMOTING COMPETI-
TION-MAINTAINING OUR ECONOMIC DRIvE, (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.edlb.gov.hk/edb/eng/
papers/compete/Booklet_Eng.pdf; GoV'T OF HONG KONG, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS, available at http://
www.edlb.gov.hk/eng/press/ue-press/com-upload/P505/Consultation-Report__eng.pdf.
117. Section 7P of the Telecommunications Ordinance (TO) authorizes the TA to investigate and regulate
any "change" in the shareholding or ownership of a licensee if it finds that such change has, or is likely to
have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in any relevant telecommunications market. See
Telecomm. Ordinance, (2004) 106, § 7P (H.K.).
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shares of Pacific Internet Limited (PacNet).18 The TA undertook a preliminary competi-
tion assessment and, in a decision released on February 16, 2007, concluded that a further
investigation was not necessary because the transaction was unlikely to increase the market
power of any of the parties or the risk of collusion in the external bandwidth services
market.
In their second decision, the TA also declined to undertake a full investigation of the
acquisition by General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) of an interest in Asia Satel-
lite Telecommunications Holdings Limited (AsiaSat Holdings) and its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company Limited (AsiaSat). In a decision
issued on May 4, 2007, the TA concluded that there was no competitive overlap between
GECC and AsiaSat and that, in any event, GECC did not appear to be an active player in
the telecommunications market in Hong Kong or elsewhere.19
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
On May 7, 2007, the TA issued a public consultation document in relation to a new set
of draft Competition Guidelines that, if adopted, will replace the current set of Competi-
tion Guidelines originally issued in June 1995.120 The new draft Competition Guidelines
aim to provide a focused explanation of how the TA proposes to determine whether par-
ticular conduct by a licensee harms competition and how licensees can effectively comply
with the law.
XIV. Developments in Hungary*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The principal legal instrument of Hungarian competition law is Act LVII of 1996 on
the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices (Competition Act). 121 There
were no amendments of significance to the Competition Act in 2007. Rather, the only
changes resulted from amendments required to implement E.U. procedures for coordinat-
ing the activities of national authorities responsible for consumer protection. 22
Of more importance was the issuance of the first Joint Communiqu6 of the President of
the Economic Competition Office (ECO) and the President of the Competition Council
118. See OFFICE OF Ti -TELECOMM. AuTH., REPORT ON THE COMPETITION IMPACT OF THE AcQuISI-
TION OF INTEREST IN PACIFIC LNTERNET (HONG KONG) LIMITED BY THE PARENT COMPANY OF ASIA
NET1COM HONG KONG LtmrITED (Feb. 16, 2007), CAB Ref. No. CDN0208.
119. See OFFICE OF THE TELECOMM. AuiiF., REPORT ON TIlE COMPETITION IMPACT OF THE ACQUIsI-
TION OF INTEREST IN ASIA SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS LIMITED BY GENERAL ELEC-
TRIC CAPITAL CORPORATIiON (May 4, 2007), CAB Ref. No. CDN0209.
120. See OFFICE OF TIlE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUrHORITY, DRAF COMPETrION GUIDELINES: FUR-
TIlER PUBLIC CONSULTATION (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/
paper/consultation/20070507.pdf. The consultation period closed on July 6, 2007 and the results are
pending.
* The contribution for Hungary was written by Kornelia Nagy-Koppany of K & P Attorneys.
121. The Competition Act (Act LVII of 1996), 2006 (Hung.), available at www.gvh.huldomain2/Files/mod-
ules/module25/pdf/Competiion-Act.pdf.
122. Parliament adopted the legislation on March 19, 2007, to become effective May 1, 2007.
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regarding the assessment of fines under the Competition Act (Communiqu6).123 Al-
though the Communiqu6 is not a legal instrument, it is intended to serve as a guideline for
future cases. According to the Communique, fines imposed under the Competition Act
are supposed to serve the following objectives: (i) to deter violations of the Competition
Act; (ii) to penalize parties that have breached the Competition Act; and (iii) to reinforce
the concept of fair market conduct. The Communiqu6 also lists the mitigating and aggra-
vating conditions that the Competition Council will evaluate in the fine assessment phase.
The current maximum fine for violations of the Competition Act is limited to 10 percent
of the annual turnover of the subject company (or group of companies) in the business
.year preceding the issuance of the decision. 2 4 Fines in excess of 5 percent of annual
turnover are still considered unusual.
The ECO also continued to investigate the conduct of various industries in 2007.125
For example, on October 17, 2007, ECO investigators raided the offices of seven wine-
producing companies that were alleged to have fixed the price of white wine grapes. 126
B. DECISIONS
In 2007, the Competition Council published a precedent setting decision involving alle-
gations by the ECO of false and misleading product claims by a major company engaged
in the business of selling personal body care products directly to consumers. 127 In its
decision, the Competition Council held that the use of "skin rejuvenation" claims is false
and misleading because skin aging can be slowed down but not stopped or reversed. The
ECO subsequently warned other companies in the cosmetics market against making simi-
lar claims.
XV. Developments in Indonesia*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Indonesian Government has issued a draft Government Regulation (Draft GR)
concerning the notification of mergers, consolidations, or acquisitions under the Indone-
sian Law on Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (Law
5/1999).128 The Draft GR proposes to establish reporting requirements to the Business
123. Pursuant to the authorization of Section 36(6) of the Competition Act, Joint Communiqu6e No. 1 of
2007 was published on October 15, 2007.
124. The Competition Act, supra note 121, art. 78.
125. Ruling No. AV-1/2007, issued on February 7, 2007, available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/mod-
ules/module25/pdf/avl_2007.pdf. See also Ruling No. AV-2/2007, issued on July 24, 2007, available at http:/
/www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/pdf/aktualis-av-media-indito-vegzes.2007 -07-24-pdf. Ear-
her sectoral investigations covered the electric energy (2006), mortgage loans (2005), and mobile telecommu-
nication (2002) industries.
126. Id.
127. V-112/2006, issued on April 12, 2007, available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/mod-
ule25/pdf/printVj 112-2006_m.pdf.
The contribution for Indonesia was written by Widyawan and Ponco Prawoko of Widyawan &
Partners.
128. Indonesian Legal Brief, General Corporate Issue No. 607 (June 14, 2007), available at http://hukumon-
line.com.
SUMMER 2008
242 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) when a merger, consolidation, or acquisi-
tion involves companies that operate in the same relevant market and, as a result, at least
one of the companies has total assets in Indonesia of more than IDR100 billion (approxi-
mately US$10.9 million) or total sales in Indonesia of more than IDR500 billion (approxi-
mately US$54.5 million).' 29
Notifiable transactions will only be required to be reported to the KPPU post-closing,
although parties may voluntarily submit their notifications pre-closing for a non-binding
opinion from the KPPU. The penalty for failure to report will be IDR1 million (approxi-
mately US$109) for every working day the failure to report persists. The KPPU will be
authorized to deny approval to a merger, consolidation, or acquisition if it determines that
the transaction is likely to result in monopolistic or unfair business practices.
B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
During 2007, the KPPU's decisions were dominated by cases involving collusion in
responding to public sector tenders for the procurement of goods and/or services (i.e., bid
rigging). These cases involved tenders, e.g., for: the construction of medium voltage
transmission cables; 130 the acquisition of high pressure sodium 70-Watt and 150-Watt
lamp components; 131 the acquisition of hospital equipment;132 the acquisition of public
lighting;133 the construction of a court building; 134 and the excavation of a naval canal.135
Penalties imposed by the KPPU included fines and orders prohibiting the parties from
participating in future tenders for a designated period of time (up to two years).
The KPPU's September 2007 decision involving tenders for the procurement of fog-
ging machines 136 within the DKI Jakarta Province is typical. The KPPU found that some
participants in the tender process had colluded in the preparation of the tender documents
(they were all prepared by the same persons) and by agreeing to offer to supply only one
129. Id.
130. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No.16/KPPU-L/2006 (June 27,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/docs/Putusan/putusan-SKTM.pdf.
131. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No.17/KPPU-L/2006 (July 4,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/docs/Putusan/putusanPJUJaksel.pdf.
132. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision, No.02/KPPU-L/2007 (July 19,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/docs/Putusan/putusan-RSUD_Wahab.pdf.
133. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No. 08/KPPU-L/2007 (Aug. 28,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=314&TRLEncryptCode=10%2F 1%2F07%2
C02%3A10%3A34.
134. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission) Decision No.03/KPPU-L/2007 (Aug. 31,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=315&URLEncryptCode=10%2F 1%2F07%2
C02%3A10%3A34.
135. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No. 05/KPPU-L/2007 (Sept. 19,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=317&URREncryptCode=1 0%2Fl 1%2F07%2
C02%3AI0%3A34.
136. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No.04/KPPU-L/2007 (Nov. 9,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=333&URLEncryptCode=ll %2F23%2F07%
2C01%3A11%3A40.
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type of product. The guilty parties were fined and banned for a period of two years from
participating in any tender put out by the provincial government of DKI Jakarta.137
In November 2007, the KPPU ordered Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd., a Singapore com-
pany (Temasek), and eight of Temasek's affiliates to divest their shareholdings in two com-
peting Indonesian mobile operators, Telekomunikasi Selular (Telkomsel) and PT Indosat,
Tbk. (Indosat). 138 The KPPU found that Temasek's shareholdings allowed it to control
both Telkomsel and Indosat, which had a combined market share of 89.61 percent. KPPU
also found that Telkomsel had been able to charge customers supra-competitive prices as a
result of this dominant market position. In addition to requiring the shares to be divested
(within two years), the KPPU ordered Temasek and its affiliates not to exercise their rights
to vote and rights to appoint directors in Telkomsel or Indosat pending the divestiture.
Temasek, Temasek's eight affiliates, and Telkomsel were each also fined IDR25 billion
(approximately US$615 million). Finally, Telkomsel was ordered by the KPPU to reduce
its rates by at least 15 percent.
XVI. Developments in Ireland*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2007, new legislation was introduced narrowing the class of media mergers that are
subject to mandatory notification to the Irish Competition Authority (the "Authority").139
As of May 1, 2007, only the following classes of mergers must give notice to the Authority
regardless of the turnovers involved: (i) mergers in which two or more of the undertakings
involved carry on a media business in Ireland and (ii) mergers in which one or more of the
undertakings involved carries on a media business in Ireland and one or more of the un-
dertakings involved carries on a media business elsewhere. 140
B. MERGERS
The most high profile transaction to come before the Authority during 2007 was the
acquisition of three Irish radio stations by Communicorp, a large Irish media group.'41
The Authority is currently undertaking a Phase 2 investigation of the transaction and is
obliged to make a decision before January 2008. In three other merger cases decided in
2007, the Authority launched Phase 2 investigations but ultimately cleared each transac-
137. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No.06/KPPU-L/2007 (Sept. 20,
2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=318&URLEncryptCode=10%2F11%2F07%
2C02%3AI0%3A34.
138. KPPU [Business Competition Supervisory Commission] Decision No. 07/KPPU-L/2007 (November
19, 2007), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/new/source.php?idy=333 &URLEncryptCode=l 1%2F23%2F07
%2C01%3A11%3A40.
* The contribution for Ireland was written by Philip Andrews, Gerald FitzGerald and Una Butler of
McCann FitzGerald.
139. Competition Act 2002 (§§ 18(5) and (6)) Order 2007 (S.I. No. 122 of 2007) (It.), available at http://
www.entemp.ie/publications/sis/2007/sil22.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See Press Release, Competition Auth., Competition Authority to Conduct Full Investigation of the
Proposed Acquisition by Communicorp Group Ltd of SRI Radio Stations (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http:I/
www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item=205.
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tion unconditionally.142 In another case, the Authority cleared the Premier Foods/RHM
merger following the submission of divestiture commitments by the parties. 143 This was
the first time that the Authority had agreed to a significant divestiture package as a condi-
tion of clearance.
On February 9, 2007, the Central Criminal Court imposed a twelve-month suspended
sentence and a fine of EUR30,000 (approximately US$46,000) on an individual convicted
of aiding and abetting an alleged price-fixing cartel involving Ford motor car dealers in
Ireland.144
In 2006, the Director of Public Prosecutions secured fifteen criminal convictions with
respect to a price-fixing cartel in the home heating oil sector in the west of Ireland, with
one individual becoming the first defendant in Europe to be tried by jury for a competi-
tion offense. 145 Additional convictions were secured in 2007. The founder of the largest
company involved in the cartel was fined EUR10,000 (approximately US$15,400), and the
company itself was fined EUR15,000 (approximately US$23,000). 146
D. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In May 2007, the Irish Supreme Court handed down its first substantive ruling on a
competition law issue in an appeal by the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) against a
High Court ruling in favor of the Authority. 147 The dispute centered on ILCU's savings
protection scheme (SPS), a fund of some EU-R70 million (approximately US$ 107.5 mil-
lion) that had been built up by contributions from ILCU credit union members over many
years. A number of credit unions had established a rival representative association, which
complained to the Authority about ILCU's refusal to extend the SPS to its members. The
High Court found that ILCU had abused its dominant position by tying the provision of
the SPS to ILCU membership. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that a pre-condition
to the application of any "tying" analysis was that the general representation services and
the SPS provided by ILCU to its members should be separate products.' 48 The Supreme
Court found that the Authority had not established that the SPS constitutes a separate
product market. Consequently, the Authority's allegation that ILCU had abused a domi-
nant position by tying these two products was unsustainable..
142. Applied Materials/Brooks Software (February, It. Competition Auth., No. M/06/087 (Feb. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.tca.ie/MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifcations/MergerNotifications.aspx?selected-
item=35 1; Galco/Sperrin, Ircompetition Auth., No. M/07/031 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.tca.ie/
MergersAcquisitions/MergerNtifications/MergersNtiications.aspxseected-item=352.
143. Premier Foods/RHM, Ir. Competition Auth., No. M/06/098 (2007) available at http://www.tca.ie/
MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifications/MergerNotifications.aspx? selected item=319.
144. See Barry Roche, Cartelism "Rife" in Motor Trade, Court Hears, IRISH TIrMS, Feb. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.ireland.com.
145. See Press Release, Competition Auth., Opening Statement by the Chairperson of the Competition
Authority, Mr. Bill Prasifka, to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Enterprise and Small Business (Oct. 25,
2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item= 177.
146. See Corrib Oil Fined €l 5,000for Role in Price-Fixing Cartel, IRISH TLMES, Jan. 24, 2007, available at http:/
/www.ireland.com.
147. Competition Auth. v. O'Regan, 120071 IESC 22 (It.).
148. Id. atT 116.
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XVII. Developments in Israel*
A. MERGERS
In April 2007, the Antitrust Tribunal rejected an appeal of the General Director's deci-
sion to block a merger between two manufacturers of steel ingots, one of which was insol-
vent at the time of the acquisition. 49 The General Director had blocked the merger on
the grounds that the two firms were the only competitors in the market with facilities for
melting scrap metal and were also the most significant purchasers of steel scrap metal in
Israel. The Antitrust Tribunal agreed with the General Director's finding that the merger
would give the combined entity monopsony power over the purchase of scrap metal. It
also held that the merged entity's monopsony power in the market for the purchase of
steel scrap metal might provide it with downstream market power in the sale of steel
ingots, at least during periods when domestic melting is preferable over the alternative of
importing steel ingots.
In May 2007, the Antitrust Tribunal issued temporary orders in relation to an unre-
ported merger between Prinir and Milos, two out of the three major competitors in Israel
in several markets for tomato products.15 0 An investigation launched by the General Di-
rector revealed that Prinir had purchased slightly less than 25 percent of its competitor's
shares and was involved in the management of the latter's business. The General Director
claimed that merger notifications should have been submitted and asked the Antitrust
Tribunal to require Prinir to divest its equity stake on the ground that the two entities
held an aggregate share of more than 50 percent in the relevant market. The General
Director also requested interim orders preventing Prinir from being involved in Milos's
business. The Antitrust Tribunal issued the interim orders on consent, pursuant to a set-
tlement between the General Director and the parties, according to which, inter alia, the
purchased shares would be held by an independent trustee under the supervision of the
General Director pending resolution of the main proceeding.
B. CARTELS
In July 2007, the Jerusalem District Court convicted several paper envelope manufac-
turers and their managers for engaging in illegal cartel conduct between 1995 and 2002.'1'
The Court determined that three of the manufacturers-Gvar'Am, Dafron, and Amka-
had conspired to allocate customers (governmental and major commercial institutions)
and cooperate on bids. The same three parties also entered into a non-import agreement
with another competitor, Orek, pursuant to which Orek received payments from the other
manufacturers in return for not importing envelopes into Israel.
* The contribution for Israel was written by Eytan Epstein and Tamar Dolev of Epstein, Chomsky,
Osnat & Co.
149. ATF [Anti Trust Filing] (]er.) 8006/03 Yehuda Pladot Ltd. v. The Antitrust Director General [2007],
available at www.antitrust.gov.il (publication no. 5000581).
150. ATF [Anti Trust Filing] (ier.) 407/07 The Antitrust Director General v. Prinir Hadas (1987) Ltd.
[2007], Civil Motion 317/07, available at www.antitrust.gov.il (publication no. 5000587).
151. CF [Criminal Filing] (ier.) 377/04 The State of Israel v. Yaron Wall [2007], available at www.antitrust.
gov.il (publication no. 5000691).
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In October 2007, Israel's Supreme Court overturned a decision of the Jerusalem Dis-
trict Court and convicted Tnuva and Meir Ezra, competitors in the marketing of food
products, for illegal cartel conduct in relation to the importation of frozen kosher meat. 152
In its decision at first instance, the District Court determined that the cooperation be-
tween the parties had amounted to a restrictive arrangement that prevented competition,
but the Court acquitted them on the grounds that they had consulted with their legal
advisors and had proceeded on what turned out to be a bona fide mistake regarding the
legal situation. 15 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the bona fide mistake defense
was not available because the defendants had failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure
the legality of their acts. The Supreme Court based this conclusion on its findings that: (i)
the defendants were aware of the prohibition against engaging in restrictive arrangements;
(ii) the legal opinions were given orally rather than in writing and were not adequately
explained; (iii) the General Director of the Israel Antitrust Authority had expressed doubts
as to the legality of the planned cooperation during a meeting with one of the defendants
prior to the arrangement; and (iv) the other defendant had been convicted in an earlier
cartel case, whose facts resembled the current case. 154
XVIII. Developments In Italy*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In February 2007, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) published procedural rules
for its leniency program. 55 The new set of procedural rules follows the reform of Law
No. 287/90 (the "Competition Act") in 2006,156 pursuant to which the ICA, in accordance
with E.U. Regulation No. 1/2003,157 was authorized to implement a leniency program.
On September 21, 2007, Legislative decrees No. 145/07 and No. 146/07 came into
force. These decrees implement E.U. Directives 2006/114/EC 158 and 2005/29/EC 159 on
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices and misleading advertising. Both de-
crees assign the power to apply these new rules to the ICA, whose investigative powers are
also substantially extended. The sanctions for both misleading and comparative advertis-
ing as well as unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices were also modified and
strengthened. 60
152. CrimA 845/02 The State of Israel v. Tnuva [2007], available at www.antitrust.gov.il (publication no.
5000700).
153. CF [Criminal Filing] 149/96 The State of Israel v. Tnuva, available at www.antitrust.gov.iI (publication
no. 3013591).
154. Id.
* The contribution for Italy was written by Alberto Pera of Gianni, Origoni, Grippo & Partners.
155. See ITALIAN COMPETITION AuTH., ICA DECISION No. 16472, DELIBERA SULLA NON IMpOSiZiONE E
SULLA RIDUZIONE DELLE SANZIONI Ai SENSI DELL'ARTICOLO 15 DELLA LEGGE 10 OrrOiORE 1990, n.
287, [ICA Bulletin No 6/2007].
156. Law No. 248/2006 [It.].
157. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 Oj. (LI) I (EC).
158. Council Directive 2006/114/EC, 2007 O.J. (L376) 21.
159. Council Directive 2005/29/EC, 2005 Oj.
160. See Decree-Law 145/07, Gazz. Uff. 207/07. art. B (I); Decree-Law 146/07. Gazz. Uff. 207/07 (It.).
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B. MERGERS
The ICA cleared several transactions involving financial institutions in 2007. For exam-
ple, in December 2006, the ICA approved the merger between San Paolo IMI and Banca
Intesa, subject to a number of significant conditions, including the divestiture of 197 retail
bank branches; the unwinding of a joint venture in the wealth management sector; and the
divestiture of a business unit active in the insurance sector.161 Other transactions involv-
ing financial institutions approved by the ICA included the merger between Societ6 In-
terbancaria per l'Automazione and Societ6 per i Servizi Bancari, 162 the merger between
the London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italiana,163 and the acquisition of Capitalia by
UniCredit1 64
C. CARTELS
The most significant development in the ICA's practice in 2007 was the extensive use of
its new power (introduced in 2006) to close investigations without a formal decision on
the basis of commitments provided by the parties. In May 2007, for example, the ICA
closed its investigation into a cartel involving the wood chipboard panel manufacturing
industry.165 One of the eight participants, the Trombini Group, benefited from the ICA's
recently enacted leniency rules and was not fined. The other seven participants, although
fined, received a reduction of 30 percent in the base amount of the fines due to their
cooperation with the ICA during the investigation.
D. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
The ICA also utilized its settlement power in several abuse of dominance cases. For
example, the ICA resolved two major abuse of dominance cases in March 2007 when it
accepted remedies proposed by the investigated firms. In the first case, the ICA closed an
investigation against ENI for the alleged abuse of a dominant position in its management
and use of a regasification plant in exchange for ENI's commitment to sell four billion
cubic meters of gas at below market prices. 166 In the second case, the ICA accepted a
commitment from Merck to grant free licences for an active ingredient so as to remove
161. See Banca Intesa/SanPaolo IMI, Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 16249, C 8027, [2007]
[Bulletin No 49/2006].
162. See Societ6 per i Servizi Bancari - SSB/Societ6 Interbancaria per l'Automazione - Cedborsa, Italian
Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 16641, C8190 [20071 [Bulletin No 12/2007]. The parties were obliged
to provide commitments aimed at reducing the risk of foreclosure in the downstream markets for clearing and
processing as well as facilitating the entry of a new operator in the upstream market for connectivity services.
163. See London Stock Exchange Group/Borsa Italiana, Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No
17132, C8699 [2007] [Bulletin No 30/2007]. The ICA concluded that there was no horizontal overlap be-
tween the parties.
164. See Unicredito Italiano/Capitalia, Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 17283, C8660 [2007]
[Bulletin No 33/2007]. UniCredit committed to divest about 150 branches; to significantly reduce, and in
specific cases to terminate, fees charged to customers for cash withdrawals from ATMs belonging to other
banks; and to reduce its stake in another bank, Mediobanca, by giving up participation equal to 9.9%.
165. See Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 16835, 1649, Produttori di pannelli truciolari in legno
[2007] [Bulletin No 20/2007].
166. See Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 16530, A 371, Gestione ed utilizzo della capacita di
rigassificazione [2007] (Bulletin No 8/20071.
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obstacles and boost competition in the production of certain pharmaceuticals using this
ingredient.167
XIX. Developments In Japan*
A. MERGERS
The Japan Fair Trade Commission's (JFTC) revised merger guidelines (Merger Guide-
lines) came into effect on March 28, 2007.168 The revised Merger Guidelines: (i) amend
the "safe harbour" rules; (ii) adopt the so-called "small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price" test for the purpose of analyzing demand and supply substitution when
defining relevant markets; and (iii) provide for additional factors to be considered in the
analysis of transactions subject to merger review. Notably, the revised Merger Guidelines
clarify that the relevant geographic market may be wider than Japan, depending upon the
nature of the relevant business.' 69
B. CARTELS
The JFTC was particularly active in the area of cartel enforcement in 2007. This effort
was aided by the JFTC's leniency program, which came into effect in January 2006. Since
that time, the JFT'C has received over 150 applications for leniency.170
In one high profile case in 2007, the JFTC was able to use information provided by a
leniency applicant to successfully prosecute several large Japanese general construction
companies for bid-rigging on a subway construction project for the Transportation Bureau
of the City of Nagoya.171 On October 10, 2007, the Nagoya District Court imposed a
fine against each of Obayashi Corporation, Kajima Corporation, Shimizu Corporation,
Okumura Corporation, and Maeda Corporation for participation in this bid-rigging
scheme. Employees of the companies were also fined, with one person sentenced to a
three year jail term that was suspended for five years. 172 Subsequently, the JFTC issued
cease and desist orders on November 14, 2007, against thirty-three companies and im-
167. See Italian Competition Auth., ICA Decision No 16597, A 364, Merck-Principiattivi [2007] [Bulletin
No 11/2007].
* The contribution for Japan was written by Shigeyoshi Ezaki of Anderson Mori & Tomotsune.
168. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Policies Dealing with Prior Consultation Regarding Busi-
ness Combination Plans (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-pagelegislation/ama/MAprior-
consultation.pdf.
169. Id.
170. See Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54
of 1947, amended by Act No. 35 of 2005, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended-
ama.pdf.
171. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Cease and Desist Order and Surcharge Paument Order
Against Corporate Bidders for the Subway Construction Project Commissioned by the City of Nagoya (Nov.
14, 2007), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp./e-page/pressreleases/2007/November/071 1 14.pdf [hereinafter
Cease and Desist Order].
172. Nagoya District Court decision (October 10, 2007). See also Yoniuri Shinbun (October 16, 2007),
available at http://chubu.yoniuri.cojp/news-top07/06._2.htm.
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posed a surcharge against fourteen companies totaling close to 2 billion yen (approxi-
mately US$19.7 billion). 173
C. REVISED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES
On September 28, 2007, the JFTC issued new Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual
Property under the Antimonopoly Act (that "New IP Guid-elines"). 74 The New IP
Guidelines: (i) expand the scope of their coverage to include all intellectual property relat-
ing to technology; (ii) introduce a "safe harbour" for conduct (roughly 20 percent or less
market share); and (iii) describe the JFTC's approach to situations where technology hold-
ers refuse to license their technologies.
XX. Developments in Korea*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Amendments to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), and the ac-
companying Enforcement Decree to the MRFTA, took effect on November 4, 2007.175
The key aspects of the amendments are described below.
1. Improvements in Merger Notification Standards
Prior to the amendments, the MRFTA required pre-merger notification when the total
assets or sales of one of the merging parties, including that of its affiliates, exceeded
KRW100 billion (approximately US$10.4 million) and the total assets or sales of the other
party, including affiliates, exceeded KRW3 billion (approximately US$3.1 million).176
Under the amended Enforcement Decree, the latter threshold has been increased to
KRW20 billion (approximately US$22 million). In regards to foreign-based companies,
notification is not required unless the Korean turnover of both the acquiring company and
the acquired company exceed KRW20 billion.
Changes were also made to the parties that are subject to the notification obligation.
Under the prior version of the MRFTA, where two or more companies formed a new
company, any party with a greater than 20 percent interest in the newly formed company
was obliged to submit a notification.177 Under the amended MRFTA, only the investor
with the largest interest is obliged to submit a merger notification, regardless of the pro-
portion of the investment.
173. See Cease and Desist Order, supra note 172.
174. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Publication of new IP Guidelines (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/2007/September/070928 -IP-Guideline.pdf.
* The contribution for Korea was written by Sai Ree Yun, Youngjin Jung and Sung Moo Jung of Yulchon.
175. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (2005), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/laws/statutes
_lists.php [hereinafter MRFTA].
176. See Enforcement Decree of MRFTA, art. 18-2, available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/laws/statutes.
lists.php.
177. See MRFTA, arts. 7(4), 12(1), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/laws/statutes-lists.php.
SUMMER 2008
250 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
2. Presumptions for Cartels
Prior to the amendments, the MRFTA permitted an unlawful cartel to be inferred on
the basis of parallel conduct without requiring actual proof of an agreement among the
parties.'78 The amendments have changed the standard of proof for finding an unlawful
agreement by requiring that there be additional circumstantial evidence ("plus factors"),
e.g., the frequency and form of contact between the parties, economic rationale for the
conduct, nature of the products/services in question, and the effects of the conduct.
B. CARTELS
In February 2007, the Korean Free Trade Commission (KFTC) imposed fines and cor-
rective measures on four domestic oil refineries for jointly fixing prices for gasoline, ker-
osene, and diesel fuel during the period of April to June 2004.179 This marks the first time
that the KFTC has imposed corrective measures and fines in the retail gasoline sector.
The case is currently being litigated in the Seoul High Court. 8 0
In April 2007, the KFTC terminated the hearing of four dynamic random access mem-
ory (DRAM) manufacturers that were being investigated for price fixing. 181 The KFTC
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of an effect on the Korean market.
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
On October 10, 2007, Microsoft withdrew its appeal of the KFTC's corrective order
against it of June 24, 2006. The withdrawal of the appeal means that Microsoft is now
obliged to comply with all of the terms of this order.182
XXI. Developments in Mexico*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On October 12, 2007, new regulations to Mexico's Federal Law on Economic Compe-
tition (FLEC) were published in the Mexican Official Gazette (Diario Oficial de la Feder-
aci6n).183 The new regulations include several changes to aspects of the Federal
Competition Commission's (FCC) proceedings, including: (i) when abbreviated proceed-
ings for pre-merger notifications will be available and (ii) the criteria to be used by the
FCC to determine the existence of predatory pricing. The new regulations also provide
178. Id. art 19-5.
179. See Press Release, KFTC, 4 Domestic Oil Refineries Jointly Increase Price (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.go.kr/new-content/allim_013v.php?ymd=2007-02-22&no=0001 (not available in English).
180. GS Coltex, Seoul High Court, case number 2007nu24175.
181. See KFTC, Termination of review for DRAM price fixing (April 26, 2007), available at http://www.
ftc.go.kr/newcontent/allim/allim_013v.php?ymd=2007-04-26&no=0001 (not available in English).
182. See KFTC, The Finding of the Microsoft Case, Dec. 7, 2005, http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/microsoft.
case/pdf.
* The contribution for Mexico was written by Lucfa Ojeda Cirdenas of SAI Abogados.
183. Ley Federal de Competenica Economica [L.F.C.E.] [Competition Law], Diario de la Federacion
[D.O., 12 de Octubre de 2007 (Mex.).
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further details regarding the FCC's leniency program, including setting out the timelines
for leniency applications.
B. MERGERS
On October 11, 2007, the FCC rejected the proposal by one of Mexico's main airlines
(Mexicana) to acquire the other main airline (Aerom~xico). The FCC denied its approval
even though Mexicana offered to abandon routes and divest airport slots as a means of
addressing competition concerns.184
The FCC also initially rejected Coca-Cola's proposed acquisition ofJugos del Valle, the
second largest producer of packaged juices, nectars, and fruit flavored beverages in Mex-
ico. The FCC, however, subsequently reconsidered its decision and permitted the trans-
action to proceed subject to the fulfillment of a series of commitments by Coca-Cola,
including: (i) to not pay rebates to retailers in exchange for exclusivity arrangements; (ii) to
not offer joint volume discounts that have the effect of "tying" sales of carbonated drinks
and juices; (iii) to divest the "Jugo del Valle" trademark for carbonated drinks sold in
Mexico; and (iv) to provide retailers with in-store refrigerators that allow competitors'
products to be placed alongside Coca-Cola products.18s
C. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The FCC initiated several investigations into alleged monopolistic practices in 2007,
including with respect to public notaries, 186 television broadcasting, s7 wire products, 188
cordless telephones,18 9 and switched call termination services. 190
In an important decision, the 13th Circuit Court dismissed an appeal by Coca-Cola of
the FCC's determination that fifty-five Coca-Cola bottlers had engaged in monopolistic
practices by entering into exclusivity contracts with retailers. The court also confirmed
the MXN10.5 million (approximately US$970,000) fine imposed by the FCC on each
bottler, for a total fine of MXN477.5 million (approximately US$44 million). 191 In a
subsequent decision, the Mexican Supreme Court also rejected a challenge by Coca-Cola
to the constitutionality of the relevant FLEC provisions. 192
184. See FCC Press Release 09-2007, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx.
185. See FCC Press Release 07-2007 (July 18, 2007), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx.
186. See File 10-02-2007, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id
=3773&Itemid=391.
187. See File DE-22-2007, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&
id=4534&Itemid=29.
188. See File DE-29-2005, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&
id=3045&Itemid=29.
189. See File DE-32-2004-I, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/resolvciones/extractosde_
resolvciones/denuncia/De-32-2004-I.pdf.
190. See File DC-07-2007 available at, http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.phpoption=com-content&task=viw&
id=4448&Itemod=29.
191. See FCC Press Release 05-2007, available at www.cfc.gob.mx.
192. See File 00418/2007-00 (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/primerasala/listanotifica-
cionlasala/buscor.asp?nexp=20070041800&asunto=2.15.
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XXII. Developments in New Zealand*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) issued a Discussion Document oudin-
ing its consideration of potential changes to the clearance and authorization procedures in
the Commerce Act 1986.193 Proposals canvassed in the Discussion Document include
introducing an informal pre-merger process, increasing the statutory timeframe for
merger clearance determinations, replacing the High Court with a specialist competition
tribunal, and introducing a clearance process for trade practices. In the coming year, it
will be revealed which, if any, of the proposals outlined in the Discussion Document will
be adopted into New Zealand's competition law framework.
In July 2007, the New Zealand Commerce Commission (the "Commission") signed a
cooperation agreement with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) that will make it easier for the two commissions to coordinate activities and co-
operate with each other.19 4 The agreement reflects an increasing desire by the Commis-
sion to cooperate with the ACCC.
B. MERGERS
Continuing the trend of the previous three years, the Commission did not receive any
applications for authorization of mergers, although it did receive eighteen applications for
voluntary clearance. Of the eighteen applications received in the period January 1 to Oc-
tober 1, 2007, nine mergers were approved, three were declined, one was withdrawn, and
five decisions were still pending at the time of writing. 195
The most high profile merger in 2007 involved separate clearance applications by New
Zealand's leading supermarket chains, Woolworths (approximately 44 percent market
share) and Foodstuffs (approximately 56 percent market share), to purchase The Ware-
house, a large general merchandise retailer and recent entrant into the grocery industry.196
After considering the applications for almost 100 days, the Commission declined both of
them on the grounds that: (i) an acquisition would remove an actual and potential compet-
itor from the market; (ii) the Warehouse was the only alternative competitor with a suita-
ble property portfolio to compete; and (iii) the return to two competitors would increase
* The contribution for New Zealand was written by Andrew Peterson of Russell McVeagh.
193. Review of the Clearance and Authorisation Provisions Under the Commerce Act 1986, Discussion
Document (May 2007) available at http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/46918/discussion-document.pdf.
194. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Cooperation Agreement Between the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission, available at http://
www.accc.gov.au/content/item/phtml?itemld=79449&nodeld=9931605c95603fbc65af294d7clc286c&fn
ACCC%20-%20NZCC%20cooperation%20agreement.pdf.
195. This data reflects merger clearance activity during the period January 1, 2007, to October 1, 2007. A
full register of clearance applications received by the Commerce Commission is available at http://www.com-
com.govt.nz/PublicRegisters/mergersacquisitions-clearances.aspx.
196. Commerce Commission, Decision Nos. 606 & 607 (June 8, 2007); Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd., Food-
stuffs (Wellington) Co-operative Society Ltd and Foodstuffs (South Island) Ltd., and Woolworths Ltd. and
The Warehouse Group Ltd., available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz//PublicRegisters/ContentFiles/Docu-
ments/PUBLIC% 20VERSION% 20Decision% 20606 %20and%206070.pdf.
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the likelihood of coordinated effects. 197 Woolworths and Foodstuffs successfully appealed
the Commission's decision to the High Court.1 98 However, the Commission has appealed
further to the Court of Appeal, citing the important precedent the decision represents.
The Commission also declined the proposed acquisition by Transpacific Industries of
rival waste management firm Envirowaste.199 The Commission's decision illustrates that
it is now looking at vertical effects more closely than in the past. In considering the
vertical aspects of this transaction, the Commission stated that it will assess whether an
acquisition will provide the merged entity with increased incentives and ability to leverage
its market power in one functional level to another functional level.200 In the Transpacific!
Envirowaste case, the Commission concluded that there could be a substantial lessening of
competition arising from vertical effects involving the markets for refuse transfer stations
and/or landfills on the one hand and waste collection on the other.
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
The March 2007 decision of the High Court in the continuation of the Koppers Arch
litigation represents a subtle but significant broadening of the scope of extra-territoriality
in New Zealand.201 This decision suggests that New Zealand courts need not consider
the location of specific acts or omissions said to give rise to a breach on the part of an
individual defendant. Instead, they may simply ask whether the defendant is liable for a
"course of conduct" that was ultimately implemented in New Zealand.
XXIU. Developments In Norway*
A. MERGERS
There was substantial merger activity in Norway in 2007. Below are some of the more
notable transactions considered by or involving the Norwegian Competition Authority
(NCA):
On January 17, 2007, the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform in-
structed Falck to sell Viking Redningstjeneste in accordance with a September 2006 deci-
sion of the NCA. The NCA blocked the merger of these companies because it considered
that the concentration would create a significant restriction on competition for different
road rescue services. 20
2
197. Id.
198. The High Court's decision is available at http://jdo.justice.govt.nz/jdo/Introduction.jsp.
199. Commerce Commission, Decision No. 604 (May 30, 2007); Transpacific Industries Group (NZ) Ltd.




201. Commerce Commission v. Koppers Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Ltd, [20071 2 N.Z.L.R. 805 (High Court);
Commerce Commission v. Koppers Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Ltd, [2006] 11 T.C.L.R. 581 (High Court). The
High Court's initial decision is discussed in YIR 2006.
* The contribution for Norway was written by Trygve Norum of Advokatfirmaet Haavind Vislie AS.
202. See NCA Case No. 2006/490.
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On June 11, 2007, the NCA conditionally approved a merger involving certain Norwe-
gian major regional daily newspapers. The conditions aim to secure customers and com-
petitors' essential access to printing services for several years. 203
On July 5, 2007, the NCA gave its conditional approval to the vertical merger between
Bankenes Betalingssentral (BBS) and Teller, involving the markets for international pay-
ment card transactions and the supply of point of sale terminals. The conditions aim to
ensure competitors access to essential infrastructure owned by BBS.204
B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
On February 19, 2007, the NCA imposed a fine of NOK45 million (approximately
US$8.7 million) on dairy producer TINE BA for abusing its dominant position by negoti-
ating an exclusive supply arrangement with the REMA 1000 grocery chain for certain
types of cheese during their annual negotiations in 2004.205 TINE also attempted to
reach a similar agreement with the RIMI grocery chain. The NCA concluded that this
was part of an effort by TINE to exclude its main competitor in Norway, Synnve Finden.
TINE has appealed the NCA's decision to the Oslo District Court. 06
XXIV. Developments in Pert*
A. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
On September 14, 2007, the Peruvian competition agency, the National Institute for
the Defence of Competition and Intellectual Property (INDECOPI), issued its decision in
a complaint filed by the Association of Tourist Agencies of Cusco against a consortium
providing transportation services to Machu Picchu (Consettur).207 Consettur is the only
company authorized to provide transportation services to Machu Picchu. The complaint
alleged that Consettur had abused its dominant position by raising the fee charged for
transporting foreign adults to Machu Picchu. INDECOPI dismissed the claim on the
grounds that it does not have the authority to prohibit allegedly excessive pricing.20s The
decision has been appealed to INDECOPI's Court for the Defence of Competition.
In another case, however, INDECOPI found an abuse of dominance by Ferrocarril
Trasandino S.A. for refusing to rent certain railway equipment to a competitor.2 09 IN-
DECOPI fined Ferrocarril Trasandino an amount equivalent to approximately
US$190,900. Similarly, INDECOPI ruled in favor of a complaint filed by the Association
of Peruvian Gas Packaging Companies against state-owned Petr6leos del Peri for refus-
203. See NCA Case no. 2007/13.
204. See NCA Case no. 2007/17.
205. See NCA Case no. 2007/2.
206. See NCA Case no. 2007/2.
* The contribution for Peru was written by Oscar Arnis Bellido of Estudio Rubio, Leguia, Normond &
Assoc.
207. See Resolution No. 052-2007-INDECOPI/CLC (Sept. 14, 2007).
208. Id.
209. See Resolution No. 1122-2007/TDC-INDECOPI, issued in the action brought by Ferrocarril San-
tuario Inca Machu Picchu S.C., the Free Competition Bureau of INDECOPI and the Supervising Entity of
Investment in Infrastructure for Public Transport-OS1TRAN against Ferrocarril Trasandino S.A.
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ing to rent terminal space to a competitor for the storage of liquid petroleum gas. IN-
DECOPI fined Petroperti an amount equivalent to approximately US$177,100.210
XXV. Developments in Poland*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On April 21, 2007, a new law on competition and consumer protection entered into
effect in Poland. 211 Ordinances of the Council of Ministers (so called "execution acts")
were also issued to replace previously applicable regulations, including new regulations
dealing with merger control,212 leniency proceedings, 213 and block exemptions. 214
The new law introduces some important changes, most notably to the merger control
regime. The aggregate worldwide turnover threshold was increased from EUR50 million
to EURI billion and a new turnover threshold of EURSO million was added specifically in
relation to operations in Poland. The new law also clarifies that, insofar as the target is
concerned, only its turnover and that of its subsidiaries are taken into account in deter-
mining whether a particular threshold is exceeded, rather than the turnover of the entire
vendor group.
B. MERGERS
The Polish competition authority (the "Polish Authority") issued a number of merger
control decisions in 2007 (partially under the previously applicable law). In most cases,
the Authority cleared the mergers without conditions. This was the case, for example, in
one of the most significant mergers that the Polish Authority dealt with in 2007, namely
the acquisition of a leading aircraft producer in Poland, Polskie Zakady Lotnicze Sp. z
o.o., by a company from United Technologies group.215 On other occasions, however, the
Polish Authority granted its clearance subject to conditions. For example, the Authority
only approved Carrefour Nederland B.V.'s acquisition of the chain of medium-sized su-
permarkets operated in Poland by Ahold Polska Sp. z o.o. on the condition that Carrefour
divest nine of its own supermarkets in Poland.216
210. See Resolution No. 0454-2007/TDC-INDECOPI (Mar. 30, 2007).
* The contribution for Poland was written by Lech Najbauer of Hogan & Hartson.
211. Act on Competition and Consumers Protection, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 50 item 331 (Pol.),
available at http://www.vokik.gov.pl/enAegal-resolutions/national-legalacts/general-legal-regulations/.
212. Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on Submission of Undertakings Concentration Intention, Jour-
nal of Laws of 2007, No. 50 item 937 (Pol.).
213. Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on Proceedings in the Event of an Entrepreneurs' Motion for
Refraining from Penalties Submitted to the President of the Office for Competition and Consumers Protec-
tion, Journal of Laws 2007, No. 134 item 938 (Pol.).
214. Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Exemption of Certain Categories of Technology Transfer
Agreements from the Prohibition of Agreements Restricting Competitions, Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 137
item 964 (Pol.).
215. See Decision of March 12, 2007 (No. DOK 32/2007).
216. See Decision of June 28, 2007 (No. DOK 86/2007).
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C. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
On October 25, 2007, the Polish Authority issued its decision that EmiTel (controlled
by Telekomunikacja Polska SA), the dominant provider of TV and radio channels distrib-
uted in Poland, abused its dominant position by imposing unfair prices for its services,
applying discriminatory terms in equivalent transactions, and imposing onerous contrac-
tual conditions. 217 EmiTel was fined PLN19 million (approximately US$8.2 million).
XXVI. Developments In Spain*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On September 1, 2007, new Spanish competition legislation came into force (Ley de
Defensa de la Competencia (LDC).218 The LDC introduced a variety of changes de-
signed to modernize the enforcement of competition law in Spain.
From an institutional perspective, one of the principal changes is that the two former
competition agencies, the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (TDC) and the Servicio
de Defensa de la Competencia (SDC), have been merged into a single national authority,
the Comisi6n Nacional de Competencia (CNC). The CNC is comprised of both an adju-
dicative arm and an investigative arm.219 As a result of these changes, the Spanish Gov-
ernment is no longer the ultimate decision-making body with respect to merger control
and is only authorized to intervene on general "public interest" grounds when the CNC
decides to block a merger or clear it subject to conditions.
The LDC also introduced several important substantive changes. In the merger con-
trol area, the market share threshold for pre-merger notifications has been raised from 25
percent to 30 percent. 220 Cartel enforcement was also enhanced with the establishment of
a leniency program, pursuant to which immunity from fines is available for the first under-
taking or individual providing the CNC with evidence that enables it to start an investiga-
tion or prove the existence of a cartel. Fine reductions are also available for any
subsequent party that provides additional evidence of value. Finally, it is no longer neces-
sary for parties to obtain an individual exemption for certain vertical and horizontal agree-
ments; undertakings will be required to self-assess whether their agreements and practices
comply with the LDC.221
One of the most important merger transactions reviewed in 2007 was the acquisition of
Buquebdis by Balearia, both of which are shipping line companies. 222 The TDC approved
the transaction notwithstanding that it would reduce two the number of parties providing
ferry services on the Algeciras-Ceuta route from three to. The TDC concluded that the
217. See Decision of October 25, 2007 (No. DOK 95/07).
* The contribution for Spain was written by Susana Cabrera and Vera Sopefia of Garrigues & Andersen.
218. Published in the Spanish Official Gazette BOE No. 159, of July 4, 2007, p. 2884, available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es/pdfs/legislacion/47ingpdf [hereinafter LDC].
219. Id. art. 12(1).
220. Id. art. (8)(1).
221. Id. arts. 1(3)-(4).
222. See Balearia/Buquebfis, Decision of the Council of Ministers of Sept. 17, 2007, BOE No. 216, p. 39916
(Oct. 2, 2007); see also Balearia/Buquebus, Report of SDC, Case N-07052; Balearia/Buquebus, TDC report
Case 104/07, available at: http://www.cncompetencia.es/index.asp?m=38&p=46.
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acquisition would not lessen competition because its primary effect was to make Balearia a
more effective competitor against Trasmediterrinea, the remaining shipping company op-
erating on this route. The TDC's decision was upheld by the Council of Ministers, sub-
ject to conditions.
C. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
There were two significant cartel cases in 2007. In Aceites, the TDC imposed fines
totalling EUR3.7 million (approximately US$5.7 million) on SOS Cuttara and eight other
retail companies for fixing the prices of two different olive oil brands sold in their out-
lets.223 In Cajas de Ahorro Vascasy Navarra, the recently created CNC imposed fines rang-
ing from EUR4 million to EUR7 million (approximately US$6.2 million to US$10.74
million) on four savings banks in Spain's northern region. The banks agreed to coordi-
nate their behavior over a fifteen year period.224
The TDC also dismissed two abuse of dominance complaints in 2007 against Telef6n-
ica, Spain's national telephone company. In Tar]etas de Pago de Telefdnica, the TDC refused
to condemn Telef6nica for abuse of a dominant position in the pre-pay phonecard market,
finding that Telef6nica's dominant position had not been proven nor was there proof of
any restrictive effects in the market resulting from Telef6nica's behavior.22 5 In Jazztel/
Telefdnica, the CNC ruled that Jazztel, a competitor of Telef6nica, had failed to prove an
abuse of dominance in the ADSC market.22
6
Certain TDC decisions were also overturned by the Spanish courts in 2007. In one
such case, Gas Natural, the Spanish National Appellate Court annulled a TDC resolution
imposing a fine of EUR8 million (approximately US$12.3 million) on Spain's national gas
company, holding that the impugned behavior (contracting for capacity reserves) could be
justified on objective and rational business grounds. 227
XXVII. Developments in Sweden*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Competition Act Review Inquiry submitted its report entitled "A New Competi-
tion Law" (sw. En ny konkurrenslag) to the Swedish government in November 2006.228
223. See TDC Resolution of June 21, 2007, Case 612/06, Aceites 2, available at http://www.cncom-
petencia.es/PDFs/resoluciones/2007/2193.pdf.
224. See TDC Resolution of Oct. 18, 2007, Case 617/06, Cajas Vascas y Navarra, available at http://www.
cncompetencia.es/PDFs/resolueciones/2007/22 30.pdf.
225. See TDC Resolution of Mar. 1, 2007, Case 610/06 Tarjetas, available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/
PDFs/resoluciones/2007/2172.pdf (last visited on Oct. 15, 2007).
226. See Resolution of Oct. 22, 2007, Case 620/06, Jazztel/Telef6nica, available at http://www.cncom-
petencia.es/PDFs/resoluciones/2007/2172.pdf.
227. See Gas Natural Judgment of the National Appellate Court (Audiencia National), Sala de lo Contenci-
oso-administrativo, Secci6n 6', S de 13 Mar. 2007 Appeal n. 471/2005.
* The contribution for Sweden was written byJakob Lundstrtm and Trina Gtransson of White & Case
LLP.
228. See Statens Offentliga Utredningar [SOU] 2006:99, Till Statsradet och chefen for Naringsdepartmentet
[government report series] (Swed.), available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/07/33/11/6fb9bSee.
pdf.
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The report rejects the notion that breaches of Swedish competition law should be
criminalized. Instead, the report suggests, inter alia, that the Swedish Competition Au-
thority (SCA) be authorized to impose administrative fines for certain infringements. The
report also suggests that individuals found to have participated in violations of the law be
disqualified from serving in corporate management. The SCA has voiced its support for
the Review Inquiry's recommendations.22 9 The report is still being considered by other
Swedish government bodies.
The government is also still considering a report issued by the SCA in October 2006
regarding Sweden's merger notification thresholds. The SCA recommends in this report
that new thresholds be introduced to reduce the number of notifications the SCA now
receives for transactions that do not raise competition issues.2 30 Finally, the SCA has
proposed that it adopt a leniency program in accordance with the ECN Model Leniency
Program. 231
B. CARTELS
In July 2007, the Stockholm District Court delivered its judgment in an asphalt cartel
case, imposing a fine of SEK460 million (approximately US$75 million) on nine asphalt
suppliers.232 This is the highest fine imposed for a cartel violation in Sweden. The Court
found that the four major defendants had agreed to allocate public procurement contracts
among themselves and to coordinate prices for the tenders, in violation of Section 6 of the
Swedish Competition Act. Among other things, the Court found that a procedure had
been put in place whereby large companies contacted the smaller ones and paid them to
not submit tenders.
C. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
In March 2007, the SCA concluded its investigation into the exclusive arrangements
between Ticnet AB, a dominant provider of event and travel tickets in Sweden, and event
promoters and ticket resellers. The SCA's investigation did not support the allegation
that these exclusive arrangements constituted an abuse of a dominant position by foreclos-
ing competition. 233
229. See Swedish Competition Auth. Statement, Dnr 743/2006 (Swed.), available at http://www.kkv.se/
upload/Filerflrycksaker/Rapporter/yttrande_06-0743 .pdf.
230. Swedish Competition Auth. Report, Konkurrensverkets Rapportserie 2006:3 (Swed.), available at http:/
/www.kkv.se/uploadlFiler/rrycksaker/Rapporter/rap-2006-3.pdf.
231. The Swedish Competition Authority's proposal is available at http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/
filer/ENG/Publications/aran.eng2006.pdf.
232. Konkurrensverket./.Kvalitetsasfalt I Mellansvergie, Tingsratl (TR) [Stockholm District Court] 2007-
07-10 ref T5467-03 (Swed.).
233. Swedish Competition Auth. Decision, dnr 444/2005, available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/
Trycksaker/Rapporter/beslut_05-0444.pdf.
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D. SECTOR INVESTIGATIONS/REPORTS
The SCA has published a report with regard to Sweden's pharmaceutical monopoly.234
The report recommends that the pharmaceutical monopoly be phased out to enhance
competitive efficiency and benefit both consumers and the economy. As a first step, the
SCA proposes to allow non-prescription drugs to be sold in regular convenience stores.
The SCA also investigated the competitive situation in the Swedish electricity market.
In particular, the agency examined whether the joint ownership of Sweden's nuclear
power facilities by the state utility Vattenfall AB and private utilities such as E.ON Sweden
AB and Fortum Oy breach Swedish competition law.235 Although the SCA did not find
any evidence of actual violations of the law, it urged the Swedish government to end this
co-ownership situation because of the considerable risk of information being unlawfully
exchanged between the competing enterprises.2 36
XXVIII. Developments in Switzerland*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On July 2, 2007, the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) published an amended
Notice regarding the Treatment of Vertical Restraints under Swiss Competition Law (the
"Vertical Restraints Notice"), which will enter into force on January 1, 2008.237 Accord-
ing to ComCo, the objective of the amendment is to bring the legal situation in Switzer-
land in line with current practice in the E.U. and the amended Federal Act on Cartels
(ACart).238 The position taken in the Vertical Restraints Notice, however, is stricter than
the approach in the E.U., particularly with regard to price recommendations. Further-
more, the Notice states that parties cannot justify vertical restrictions solely on the basis
that interbrand competition exists in the particular market.
234. Swedish Competition Authority Report, Rapportserie 2007:1 Avveckla apoteksmonoploet med konsu-
mentnyttan I focus! (Swed.), available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/FilerfTrycksaker/Rapporter/rap-2007-1.
pdf.
235. See Press Release, Swedish Competition Authority, End Co-Ownership of Nuclear Power! (2007),
available at http://www.kkv.se/tNewsPage____2472.aspx.
236. Id.
* The contribution for Switzerland was written by Dr. Patrick Sommer, Stefan Brunnschweiler and
Marquard Christen of CMS von Erlach Henrici.
237. See Bekanntmachung uiber die wettbewerbsrechtliche Behandlung vehkoler Abreden [Notice on the
Competition Law Treatment of Vertical Agreement] July 2, 2007, available at http://www.weko.admin.ch/
publikationen/00213/index.html?lang= de&PHPSESSID=a273bbd16bf009ab7f67c2c261b555b7 (in German)
and http://www.weko.admin.ch/imperia/md/images/weko/43.pdf (in English).
238. See Swiss Competition Comm'n, Annual Report 2006 of the Competition Commission Accordance
with Article 49(2) ACart, available at http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/00188/Jahresbericht-2006-E.
pdf.lang=en&PHPSESSID=3d18cb9. For an unofficial English translation of the ACart, see http://www.
weko.admin.ch/imperia/md/images/weko/lcart-english-120107.pdf.
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B. MERGERS
On September 4, 2007, ComCo cleared Migros's acquisition of Denner, subject to con-
ditions.239 Migros is Switzerland's largest retailer while Denner is its third largest food
retailer. The conditions included that: (i) Denner retain its independent brand presence
in the market; (ii) Migros and Denner not combine their purchasing; and (iii) Migros not
acquire any other food-retailer in Switzerland without ComCo's approval. 240 The condi-
tions must be adhered to for a period of two to seven years and will be monitored by an
independent auditor to be appointed by ComCo. Migros may request that the conditions
be amended or rescinded if market circumstances change, including if German retailers
Aldi and Lidl increase their presence in Switzerland by a material degree.
C. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
On February 5, 2007, ComCo held that Swisscom Mobile, the largest mobile phone
provider in Switzerland, abused its dominant position in the Swiss mobile phone market
by charging consumers an excessive termination fee for routing calls from other providers
into their own mobile phone networks.241 ComCo imposed a fine of over CHF333 mil-
lion (approximately US$326 million) on Swisscom Mobile, which is by far the largest fine
ever imposed in Switzerland for a competition violation. Swisscom Mobile has appealed
ComCo's decision to the Federal Administrative Court.
On February 6, 2007, the Swiss Federal Court (SFC) confirmed ComCo's decision
prohibiting the so-called "Sammelrevers" system for book pricing in Switzerland.2 42
Under this system, bookshops were requested not to deviate from resale prices fixed by
publishers. For example, approximately 90 percent of the German language books sold in
Switzerland were subject to this system. The SFC held that the agreement could not be
justified on the grounds of economic efficiency.243 The publishers and booksellers there-
after applied to the Swiss Federal Council for an exceptional authorization on grounds of
overriding public interests under Article 8 ACart. This request was rejected by the Fed-
eral Council on May 7, 2007.244




241. The decision in German is available at http://www.weko.admin.ch/news/00008/Verfuegung-
Mobilfunk.pdflang=de. A summary in French is available at http://www.//weko.admin.ch/publikationen/
pressemitteilungen/00271/PressekonferenzjfSwisscomMobileZusammenfassung-Entscheid.pd lang=fr.
242. Bundesgerichtsentscheib (BGE) [Federal Court] Feb. 6, 2007, 2A.430/2006 Entscheidunsem des
Schweizeriscten Bundesrichter [BGE], available at http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=06.02.2007-
2A.430/2006 (in German).
243. Id.
244. Schweizeriscten Bundesrat [Federal Council] May 7, 2007 (Switz), available at http://www.weko.admin.
ch/publikationen/00212/RPW2007-2.pdf?lang=de (in German).
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XXIX. Developments in Ukraine*
A. MERGERS
Merger control in Ukraine continues to grow in importance as the number of merger
clearance applications received by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) in-
creases each year. 245
One of the most notable merger cases of 2007 involved the acquisition of Smart Hold-
ing by System Capital Management, the largest holding company in Ukraine. 24- The
transaction raised concerns about the merged entity acquiring a dominant position in the
supply of raw iron in Ukraine. Following numerous complaints by Ukrainian metal com-
panies, the AMCU agreed to clear the merger on the condition that one of Smart Hold-
ing's subsidiaries, Inhuletckay Ore Enrichment plant, be required to sell its raw iron ore
products to all customers at equal prices.2 47
B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Kyev Commercial Court of Appeals issued a decision in October 2007 reversing a
judgment of the Commercial Court of the City of Kyev and affirming the AMCU's total
fine of UAH17.2 million (approximately US$3.4 million) against seven wholesale sugar
traders for agreeing to increase wholesale sugar prices.248
The AMCU also fined the European Consulting Agency (ECA) UAH875,500 (approxi-
mately US$173,405) for abuse of a dominant position in the provision of electronic infor-
mation services for state procurements. 249 Among other things, the ECA, which is
Ukraine's only Internet service provider certified to publish state procurement announce-
ments, forced procuring entities to use a complimentary consulting service for excessively
high fees. The ECA also obstructed the AMCU's investigation.
* The contribution for Ukraine was written by Mariya Niznik and Denis Lysenko of Vasil Kisil &
Partners.
245. See Results of AMCU activity for 2006 (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/con-
trol/uk/publish/article?artid=62414&cat_id=61944; Article 42 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides for
the protection of fair competition and prohibits the abuse of a monopoly position. See Constitution of
Ukraine No. 254K/96BP (June 28, 1996) available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-binlaws/main.cgi?nreg=
254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%FO; Chapter 3 of the Commercial Code of Ukraine and Law of Ukraine No.
22-10 On Protection of Economic Competition (Jan. 11, 2001) is the key competition legislation in Ukraine
and include the regulation of merger transactions.
246. See Press Release, AMCU, Oct., 15, 2007 available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/
article?artid=79653 &cat id=60177.
247. Id.
248. See Press Release, AMCU, Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www/amc.gove.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/
article?artid=64634&catid=64109.
249. See Press Release, AMCU, July 17, 2007, available at http://www.amc.gove.ua/amc/controlluk/publish/
article?/art id=75369&catid=641 10.
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XXX. Developments in the United Kingdom*
A. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In parallel with similar work being done by the European Commission on private en-
forcement (with the Green Paper in 2005 and a White Paper expected in early 2008), the
U.K. Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published a discussion paper on facilitating effective
redress for consumers and businesses that have been harmed by breaches of competition
law.250 The OFT has suggested that to increase the incentives for compliance with com-
petition law, private actions should be possible both on a stand-alone basis and as follow-
on actions.
B. MERGERS
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (SoS) referred BSkyB's acquisition of a
17.9 percent stake in ITV to the Competition Commission.25' This followed the first
ever intervention by the SoS in an investigation by the OFT on grounds of public interest
in media ownership. The Competition Commission subsequently published its provi-
sional findings that BSkyB's acquisition of a 17.9 percent stake in ITV constitutes a
merger situation and restricts competition. 252
C. CARTELS
In August 2007, British Airways was fined a record GBP121.5 million (approximately
US$245 million) after it admitted colluding with Virgin Atlantic to raise fuel surcharges
on tickets between August 2004 and January 2006.253 Virgin Atlantic received immunity
from fines as the whistleblower on the cartel, in line with the OFT's Leniency Policy. 254
This example illustrates a clear policy shift to much larger fines. The OFT also con-
ducted an on-site search at a private address for the first time as part of its criminal investi-
gation into the alleged marine hoses cartel. 255
* The contribution for the United Kingdom was written by Stephen Kon, Dr. Gordon Christian and
Simran Dhir of SJ Berwin LLP.
250. Office of Fair Trading, Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers and
Business (2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/comp-policy/of916.pdf. As part of
the 2007 pre-budget report, the U.K. Finance Minister announced that the U.K. government intended to
consider measures to facilitate redress of losses flowing from breaches of competition law.
251. See Press Release, Department of Trade and Industry (National), British Sky Broadcasting/lTV State-
ment (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.gnn.gov.uk/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseD=286812&New-
sArealD=2.
252. Competition Commission, Acquisition by British Sky Broadcasters PLC of 17.9 Per Cent of the Shares
in ITV PLC Provisional Findings Report, Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www.competition-commission.
org.uk/inquiries/ref2007/itv/pdf/prov find-report.pdf.
253. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, British Airways to Pay Record £121.5m Penalty in Price
Fixing Investigation (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/113-07.
254. Id.
255. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Launches Criminal Investigation into Alleged Interna-
tional Big Rigging, Price Fixing and Market Allocation Cartel (May 3, 2007), available at http:/ /www.oft.
gov.uk/news/press/2007/70-07.
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Finally, the OFT also issued a statement of objections to five major supermarkets and
certain dairy producers setting out a provisional finding that they colluded to raise the
price of dairy products between 2002 and 2003 by sharing commercially sensitive pricing
information. The OFT estimated that this alleged infringement cost consumers approxi-
mately GPB270 million (approximately US$545 million).2s6
D. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The OT launched new market investigations in 2007 into retail bank pricing,257 per-
sonal current accounts, 258 distribution of medicines in the UK, 259 and the house building
industry.260 The Competition Commission also launched an investigation into the leasing
of rolling stock for franchised passenger services.26' In addition, the Competition Com-
mission published its emerging thinking in relation to the inquiry into the supply of gro-
ceries by retailers in the UK.26 2
E. COMPETITION LITIGATION
In the first case of its kind, a representative action for damages on behalf of consumers
was initiated by a consumer association before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the
"CAT"). The matter involves an action against JJB Sports, which was found guilty of
fixing prices of replica football kits.263 Purchasers of electrical and mechanical carbon and
graphite products also filed a claim at the CAT for damages against the members of the
price-fixing and market-sharing cartel relating to carbon and graphite products. 264 The
CAT is also now dealing with an action for damages brought byJJ Burgess & Sons follow-
ing the CAT's decision that a funeral company had abused its dominant position by refus-
ing the claimant access to a crematorium that the former owned and maintained. 265 The
256. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Issues Provisional Decision Against Supermarkets and
Dairies over Price Fixing (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/134-07.
257. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Announces 'Quick Fix' on Bank Charges will Disadvan-
tage Customers (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/54-07.
258. See Office of Fair Trading, OFT Launches Market Study into Personal Current Accounts (Apr. 26,
2007), http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/67-07; see also Office of Fair Trading, Personal Current Ac-
counts in the UK (2007), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/financial-products/oft9l8.pdf.
259. See Office of Fair Trading, Distributions of Medicine in the UK (2007), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-
oft/reports/comp-policy/oft914.pdf
260. See Office of Fair Trading, OFT Launches Groundbreaking Study into UK Housebuilding Market
fJune 22, 2007), http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/90-07; see also Office of Fair Trading, Home Build-
ing- Reasons for a Market Study (2007), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/comp-policy/oft934.pdf
261. See Press Release, Competition Commission, Rolling Stock Market Investigation-Issues Statement
(Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/press rel/2007/aug/pdf/49-07.pdf.
262. Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation Emerging Thinking, (2007), http://www.
competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/ emerging .thinking.pdf.
263. Consumers' Association v. JJB Sports, (2007) 078/7/9/07, Notice of Claim, available at http://www.
catribunal.org.uk/documents/Note1O78ConsumersO5O3O7.pdf.
264. Emerson Electric v. Morgan Crucible, (2007) 1077/5/7/07, Application, available at http://w-,.ca-
tribunal.org.uk/documents/Application1077EmersonO9O2O7.pdf.
265. JJ Burgess & Sons v. Stevenage Ltd., (2007) 1088/5/7/07 Notice of Claim for Damages, available at
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/Notice-AppeallO88Burgess230807.pdf.
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claimant is requesting damages for loss of revenues and costs incurred as a result of this
abuse of a dominant position.
XXXI. Developments in the United States*
A. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court released four antitrust judgments in 2007, each of which was
decided in favor of the defendants.
In Twombly,266 the Court held that a conspiracy claim under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act should be dismissed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it includes
"enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement," thereby moving a claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible."267 As
the lower courts begin to grapple with the implications of the Twombly decision, it is note-
worthy that this higher threshold for notice pleadings will potentially impact other types
of allegations as well, both antitrust and non-antitrust.
68
In Leegin, the Court, in a five to four decision, overruled a ninety-five-year-old rule that
it is per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to agree with its
distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer's
goods and held that all vertical price restraints are now to be judged under the rule of
reason. 269 The Court emphasized that economic literature is "replete" with pro-competi-
tive justifications for vertical price-restraints, including the reduction of intra-brand com-
petition among retailers in order to increase inter-brand competition among
manufacturers. 270
Continuing its trend of deference to specific regulatory regimes, the Court held in
Credit Suisse Securities that U.S. securities laws implicitly preclude the application of U.S.
antitrust laws to challenged conduct involving initial public offerings. 271
Finally, in Weyerhauser, the Court unanimously held that the stringent, two-part stan-
dard for liability used in predatory selling cases, as articulated in a 1993 Supreme Court
decision, should also apply in predatory buying cases ("predatory bidding").272 This stan-
dard requires proof that the predatory bidding caused the firm to lower its prices below
* The contribution for the United States was written by Fiona Schaeffer, Marisa Leto, David Yolkut and
Justin Wagner of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP.
266. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1961 (2007) (holding that a conspiracy claim under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act should be dismissed when it alleges only parallel conduct, absent "some factual
context suggesting agreement.").
267. Id. at 1965, 1974.
268. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d. Cir. 2007) (noting "conflicting signals" resulting in
"some uncertainty" as to the scope of the Twombly decision, but averring that "we are reluctant to assume
that [Twombly] . . . applies only to section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or, slightly
more broadly, only to antitrust cases").
269. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (overruling the per se rule
set forth in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
270. Id. at 2714-15 (citing economic studies, and noting that "[r]esale price maintenance ... has the poten-
tial to give consumers more options").
271. Credit Suisse Securities (USA, L.L.C. v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007).
272. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007). See YIR 2006 for
a further discussion of this case.
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some measure of its costs and that the firm had a dangerous probability of recouping its
losses upon its rival's exit from the market.
B. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (the "Agencies") issued
a joint report on April 17, 2007 on the Agencies' enforcement approach to the antitrust
issues that arise from the exercise of intellectual property rights (the "2007 Report"). 273
The 2007 Report affirms that, among other things: mere unilateral, unconditional refusals
to license patents should not result in antitrust liability; timely unilateral announcement of
price or licensing terms to a standard-setting organization (SSO) is not a violation of
Sherman Act Sections 1 or 2; and including substitute patents in a pool does not render
the pool per se or presumptively anti-competitive. In addition, the 2007 Report indicates
the Agencies will apply a rule of reason analysis to the following conduct: joint ex ante
collaboration on licensing terms by SSO participants; tying arrangements involving intel-
lectual property; and most agreements with the potential to extend market power con-
ferred by a patent beyond its expiration.2 74
C. MERGERS
In August 2008, Whole Foods Market, Inc., acquired Wild Markets, Inc., after a failed
attempt by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to block the acquisition. The district
court denied the FTC's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger during
the pendency of an administrative proceeding, despite evidence displaying anti-competi-
tive intent behind the merger.2? 5 The court found that the FTC had failed to demon-
strate a likelihood of success in establishing that the merger's effects would be to
substantially lessen competition or would tend to create a monopoly in the relevant prod-
uct and geographic markets. 276
Similarly, the FTC lost a motion for a preliminary injunction to block a proposed
merger in the refining industry when the district court ruled that the two companies did
not compete directly against one another and operated in a competitive marketplace. 277
Of note, the defendant in this case used the FTC's own pricing studies as affirmative
evidence in support of the proposed merger and, as in the Whole Foods acquisition, was
able to prevail in spite of an unflattering internal document produced by the company.278
273. U.S. Dep't ofJustice and FTC., Report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Pro-
moting Innovation and Competition (2007), available at http://ftc.gov//reports/innovation/P04010lPromot-
inglnnovationandCompetiionrpt0704.pdf.
274. Id.
275. See FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2007).
276. Id. at 49-50. The District of Columbia Circuit Court subsequently denied the FTC's motion for an
injunction pending appeal of the district court's decision. See FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 07-
5276, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20539 (D.C.C. Aug. 23, 2007). The FTC's appeal before the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals is pending as of the time of writing.
277. See FTC v. Foster, No. CIV 07-352 JB/ACT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47866 (D.N.M. May 30, 2007).
278. Id. at *109-112.
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The FTC subsequently voted narrowly to dismiss their administrative complaint against
this merger.279
D. CoNDUcT
In the area of standard setting, the Third Circuit found that a patent holder's false
promise to license essential technology within a standard-setting organization can consti-
tute anti-competitive behavior under the Sherman Act if the organization relies on the
promise and the patent holder ultimately breaches.280
Broadening the defenses available to defendants facing Robinson-Patman litigation, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to defendants in a case involving
loyalty discounts, relying primarily on the functional availability doctrine.28'
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that the exclusionary conduct element of a Sherman
Act Section 2 claim cannot be satisfied in the context of "bundled discounts," unless the
discounts result in pricing below a specific measure of costs.2 82 This decision appears to
create a circuit split in light of a disparate holding of the Third Circuit in LePage's Inc. v.
3M.283 The issue of how to distinguish anti-competitive from lawful product bundles is
now ripe for Supreme Court review.
279. See Press Release, FTC, Statement of the Commission Concerning Dismissal of the Administrative
Complaint (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9323/071003statement.pdf.
280. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cit. 2007).
281. See Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 872 (6th Cir. 2007).
282. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cit. 2007).
283. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
VOL. 42, NO. 2
